Moral perception
著者
書誌事項
Moral perception
（Soochow university lectures in philosophy）
Princeton University Press, c2013
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
We can see a theft, hear a lie, and feel a stabbing. These are morally important perceptions. But are they also moral perceptions--distinctively moral responses? In this book, Robert Audi develops an original account of moral perceptions, shows how they figure in human experience, and argues that they provide moral knowledge. He offers a theory of perception as an informative representational relation to objects and events. He describes the experiential elements in perception, illustrates moral perception in relation to everyday observations, and explains how moral perception justifies moral judgments and contributes to objectivity in ethics. Moral perception does not occur in isolation. Intuition and emotion may facilitate it, influence it, and be elicited by it. Audi explores the nature and variety of intuitions and their relation to both moral perception and emotion, providing the broadest and most refined statement to date of his widely discussed intuitionist view in ethics. He also distinguishes several kinds of moral disagreement and assesses the challenge it poses for ethical objectivism.
Philosophically argued but interdisciplinary in scope and interest, Moral Perception advances our understanding of central problems in ethics, moral psychology, epistemology, and the theory of the emotions.
目次
Preface vii Acknowledgments xi Introduction 1 PART ONE Perception and Moral Knowledge 5 Chapter 1 Perception: Sensory, Conceptual, and Cognitive Dimensions 7 * I. Major Kinds of Perception 8 * II. The Phenomenology and Content of Perception 12 * III. The Basis of Veridical Perception 21 Chapter 2 Moral Perception: Causal, Phenomenological, and Epistemological Elements 30 * I. The Perception of Right and Wrong 30 * II. The Representational Character of Moral Perception 38 Chapter 3 Perception as a Direct Source of Moral Knowledge 51 * I. Perception and Inference 51 * II. Can Moral Perception Be Naturalized? 55 * III. Moral Perception as a Basis of Moral Knowledge 58 PART TWO Ethical Intuition, Emotional Sensibility, and Moral Judgment 67 Chapter 4 Perceptual Grounds, Ethical Disagreement, and Moral Intuitions 69 * I. Does Moral Disagreement Undermine Justification in Ethics? 70 * II. The Concept of an Intuition 83 * III. Intuitions as Apprehensions 96 Chapter 5 Moral Perception, Aesthetic Perception, and Intuitive Judgment 103 * I. The Role of Intuition in Aesthetic Experience 103 * II. Aesthetic and Moral Properties: Comparison and Contrast 106 * III. The Rule-Governed Element in Ethics and Aesthetics 109 * IV. The Reliability of Intuition 112 Chapter 6 Emotion and Intuition as Sources of Moral Judgment 121 * I. Emotion and Intuition: Interaction and Integration 122 * II. The Evidential Role of Emotion in Moral Matters 136 Chapter 7 The Place of Emotion and Moral Intuition in Normative Ethics 143 * I. Emotion and Moral Intuition 143 * II. Moral Imagination as a Nexus of Intuition, Emotion, and Perception 157 * III. Intuition and Moral Judgment 161 Conclusion 170 Index 175
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