Contemporary debates in epistemology
著者
書誌事項
Contemporary debates in epistemology
(Contemporary debates in philosophy, 14)
Wiley Blackwell, 2014
2nd ed.
- : pbk
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Fully updated with new topics covering the latest developments and debates, the second edition of this highly influential text retains its unique combination of accessibility and originality.
Second edition of a highly influential text that has already become a standard in the field, for students and professional researchers alike, due to its impressive line-up of contributors, and its unique combination of accessibility and originality
Twenty-six essays in total, covering 13 essential topics
Features five new topics that bring readers up to speed on some of the latest developments in the field, and give them a glimpse of where it's headed: Should knowledge come first? Do practical matters affect whether you know? Is virtuous motivation essential to knowing? Can knowledge be lucky? Can evidence be permissive?
Substantially updates two other debates: Is there immediate justification? Can belief be justified through coherence alone?
目次
Notes on Contributors viii Preface to the Second Edition xiii
Preface to the First Edition xiv
1 Should Knowledge Come First? 1
Knowledge First Timothy Williamson 1
What Is Knowledge-first Epistemology? Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew 10
Experience First Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew 17
Knowledge Still First Timothy Williamson 22
Still Nowhere Else to Start Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew 25
2 Is Knowledge Closed under Known Entailment? 27
The Case against Closure Fred Dretske 27
The Case for Closure John Hawthorne 40
Reply to Hawthorne Fred Dretske 56
3 Is Knowledge Contextual? 60
Contextualism Contested Earl Conee 60
Contextualism Defended Stewart Cohen 69
Contextualism Contested Some More Earl Conee 75
Contextualism Defended Some More Stewart Cohen 79
4 Do Practical Matters Affect Whether You Know? 84
Practical Matters Affect Whether You Know Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath 84
Practical Matters Do Not Affect Whether You Know Baron Reed 95
5 Can Skepticism Be Refuted? 107
The Refutation of Skepticism Jonathan Vogel 108
The Challenge of Refuting Skepticism Richard Fumerton 120
6 Are Intellectually Virtuous Motives Essential to Knowledge? 133
Knowledge Need Not Be Virtuously Motivated Jason Baehr 133
Knowledge and the Motive for Truth Linda Zagzebski 140
Reply to Zagzebski Jason Baehr 146
Reply to Baehr Linda Zagzebski 149
7 Can Knowledge Be Lucky? 152
Knowledge Cannot Be Lucky Duncan Pritchard 152
Knowledge Can Be Lucky Stephen Hetherington 164
8 Is There a Priori Knowledge? 177
In Defense of the a Priori Laurence BonJour 177
There Is No a Priori Michael Devitt 185
Reply to Devitt Laurence BonJour 195
Reply to BonJour Michael Devitt 197
Last Rejoinder Laurence BonJour 200
9 Is There Immediate Justification? 202
There Is Immediate Justification James Pryor 202
There Is no Immediate Justification Juan Comesana 222
Reply to Comesana James Pryor 235
Reply to Pryor Juan Comesana 239
10 Can Belief Be Justified Through Coherence Alone? 244
Non-foundationalist Epistemology: Holism, Coherence, and Tenability Catherine Z. Elgin 244
Why Coherence Is Not Enough: A Defense of Moderate Foundationalism James Van Cleve 255
Reply to Van Cleve Catherine Z. Elgin 267
Reply to Elgin James Van Cleve 271
11 Is Infinitism the Solution to the Regress Problem? 274
Infinitism Is the Solution to the Regress Problem Peter Klein 274
Infinitism Is Not the Solution to the Regress Problem Carl Ginet 283
Reply to Ginet Peter Klein 291
Reply to Klein Carl Ginet 295
12 Can Evidence Be Permissive? 298
Evidence Can Be Permissive Thomas Kelly 298
Evidence Cannot Be Permissive Roger White 312
13 Is Justification Internal? 324
Justification Is Not Internal John Greco 325
Justification Is Internal Richard Feldman 337
14 Is Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal? 351
Truth Is Not the Primary Epistemic Goal Jonathan L. Kvanvig 352
Truth as the Primary Epistemic Goal: A Working Hypothesis Marian David 363
Index 378
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