Precaution incentives in accident settings

Author(s)

• Friehe, Tim

Bibliographic Information

Precaution incentives in accident settings

Tim Friehe

（Gabler Edition Wissenschaft, Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts）

Gabler, 2008

Note

Originally presented as the author's thesis--Univ. Tübingen, 2008

Description and Table of Contents

Description

Tim Friehe analyzes important aspects for the design of tort law which intends to induce optimal individual choices and possible limitations of workable tort law in varied settings. He highlights the consequences of the consideration of hitherto neglected behavioral dimensions for the conclusions of the economic analysis of tort law.

Table of Contents

• The Economics of Tort Law: Basics and Selected Core Themes
• Incentive Effects of Damage Averaging in Tort Law
• Superiority of Damage Averaging in the Case of Strict Liability
• Screening Accident Victims
• Judgment Proofness and Risk Aversion
• Similarity of Bilateral Harm and Unilateral Harm with Role-Type Uncertainty
• Avoidance Activities after Accidents

by "Nielsen BookData"

Details

• NCID: BB13528480
• ISBN:
  • 9783834912923
• Country Code: gw
• Title Language Code: eng
• Text Language Code: eng
• Place of Publication: Wiesbaden
• Pages/Volumes: xiv, 187 p.
• Size: 21 cm
• Classification:
  • SG : 340.115
  • SG : 340;330
• Subject Headings:
  • SWD : Unerlaubte Handlung -- Schaden -- Prävention -- Ökonomische Theorie des Rechts
• Parent Bibliography ID:
  • BA24050732