The conceptual link from physical to mental
著者
書誌事項
The conceptual link from physical to mental
Oxford University Press, 2013
- : hbk
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. [214]-221) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
How are truths about physical and mental states related? Physicalism entails that non-physical truths are redescriptions of a world specifiable in narrowly physical terms. In The Conceptual Link from Physical to Mental Robert Kirk argues that physicalists must therefore hold that the physical truth 'logico-conceptually' entails the mental truth: it is impossible for broadly logical and conceptual reasons that the former should have held without the latter.
'Redescriptive physicalism' is a fresh approach to the physical-to-mental connection that he bases on these ideas. Contrary to what might have been expected, this connection does not depend on analytic truths: there are holistic but non-analytic conceptual links, explicable by means of functionalism-which, he
argues, physicalism entails. Redescriptive physicalism should not be confused with 'a priori physicalism': although physicalists must maintain that phenomenal truths are logico-conceptually entailed by physical truths, they must deny that they are also entailed a priori. Kripke-inspired 'a posteriori physicalism', on the other hand, is too weak for physicalism, and the psycho-physical identity thesis is not sufficient for it. Though non-reductive, redescriptive physicalism is an excellent basis
for dealing with the problems that mental causation raises for other non-reductive views. 'Cartesian intuitions' of zombies and transposed qualia may seem to raise irresistible objections; Kirk shows that the intuitions are false. As to the 'explanatory gap', there is certainly an epistemic gap, but
it has a physicalistically acceptable explanation which deals effectively with the problem of how the physical and functional facts fix particular phenomenal facts.
目次
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Redescription and logico-conceptual entailment
- 3. Logico-conceptual entailment and other notions
- 4. Supervenience
- 5. Psycho-physical identity and functionalism
- 6. A posteriori physicalism - but not as we know it
- 7. A priori versus redescriptive physicalism
- 8. Redescription, reduction, and mental causation
- 9. Phenomenal truths are entailed logico-conceptually, but not a priori
- 10. Against the intuitions - and why it's like this
- Bibliography
- Index
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