Inadvertent escalation : conventional war and nuclear risks
著者
書誌事項
Inadvertent escalation : conventional war and nuclear risks
(Cornell studies in security affairs / edited by Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt)(Cornell paperbacks)
Cornell University Press, 2014, c1991
- : pbk
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. 263-274) and index
"First published 1991 ... Cornell paperbacks edition, 2014"--T.p. verso
内容説明・目次
内容説明
In this sobering book, Barry R. Posen demonstrates how the interplay between conventional military operations and nuclear forces could, in conflicts among states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, inadvertently produce pressures for nuclear escalation. Knowledge of these hidden pressures, he believes, may help some future decision maker avoid catastrophe.Building a formidable argument that moves with cumulative force, he details the way in which escalation could occur not by mindless accident, or by deliberate preference for nuclear escalation, but rather as a natural accompaniment of land, naval, or air warfare at the conventional level. Posen bases his analysis on an empirical study of the east-west military competition in Europe during the 1980s, using a conceptual framework drawn from international relations theory, organization theory, and strategic theory.The lessons of his book, however, go well beyond the east-west competition. Since his observations are relevant to all military competitions between states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, his book speaks to some of the problems that attend the proliferation of nuclear weapons in longstanding regional conflicts. Optimism that small and medium nuclear powers can easily achieve "stable" nuclear balances is, he believes, unwarranted.
目次
1. Introduction: A Model of Inadvertent Escalation
2. Air War and Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation
3. The Balance of Ground Forces on the Central Front
4. Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank
5. "Offensive" and "Defensive" Sea Control: A Comparative Assessment
6. ConclusionAppendix 1. The Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) Model
Appendix 2. Central Region Close Air Support Aircraft and Atack Helicopters (1988)
Appendix 3. The Attrition-FEBA Expansion Model: Symphony Version
Appendix 4. A Barrier Defense ModelSelected Bibliography
Index
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