Free will, agency, and meaning in life

Bibliographic Information

Free will, agency, and meaning in life

Derk Pereboom

Oxford University Press, 2014

  • : [hardcover]

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Includes bibliographical references (p. [200]-214) and indexes

Description and Table of Contents

Description

Derk Pereboom articulates and defends an original conception of moral responsibility. He argues that if determinism were true we would not be morally responsible in the key basic-desert sense at issue in the free will debate, but that we would also lack this kind of moral responsibility if indeterminism were true and the causes of our actions were exclusively states or events. It is possible that if we were undetermined agent-causes-if we as substances had the power to cause decisions without being causally determined to cause them-we would have this kind of free will. But although our being undetermined agent causes has not been ruled out as a coherent possibility, it's not credible given our best physical theories. Pereboom then contends that a conception of life without the free will required for moral responsibility in the basic-desert sense would nevertheless allow for a different, forward-looking conception of moral responsibility. He also argues that our lacking this sort of free will would not jeopardize our sense of ourselves as agents capable of rational deliberation, that it is compatible with adequate measures for dealing with crime and other threatening behavior, and that it allows for a robust sense of achievement and meaning in life. Pereboom's arguments for this position are reconfigured relative to those presented in Living without Free Will (2001), important objections to these arguments are answered, and the development of the positive view is significantly embellished.

Table of Contents

  • Acknowledgments
  • Introduction
  • 1. Defending a Source View
  • 2. Problems for Event-Causal and Non-Causal Libertarianisms
  • 3. The Prospects for Agent Causal Libertarianism
  • 4. A Manipulation Argument against Compatibilism
  • 5. Free Will Skepticism and Rational Deliberation
  • 6. Blame without Basic Desert
  • 7. Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Behavior
  • 8. Personal Relationships and Meaning in Life
  • Bibliography

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Details
  • NCID
    BB1532276X
  • ISBN
    • 9780199685516
  • Country Code
    uk
  • Title Language Code
    eng
  • Text Language Code
    eng
  • Place of Publication
    Oxford
  • Pages/Volumes
    vii, 219 p.
  • Size
    24 cm
  • Classification
  • Subject Headings
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