Anarchy unbound : why self-governance works better than you think

Bibliographic Information

Anarchy unbound : why self-governance works better than you think

Peter T. Leeson

(Cambridge studies in economics, choice, and society)

Cambridge University Press, 2014

  • : hardback

Available at  / 4 libraries

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Note

Includes bibliographical references (p. 227-242) and index

Description and Table of Contents

Description

In Anarchy Unbound, Peter T. Leeson uses rational choice theory to explore the benefits of self-governance. Relying on experience from the past and present, Professor Leeson provides evidence of anarchy 'working' where it is least expected to do so and explains how this is possible. Provocatively, Leeson argues that in some cases anarchy may even outperform government as a system of social organization, and demonstrates where this may occur. Anarchy Unbound challenges the conventional self-governance wisdom. It showcases the incredible ingenuity of private individuals to secure social cooperation without government and how their surprising means of doing so can be superior to reliance on the state.

Table of Contents

  • 1. Anarchy unbound
  • Part I. Self-Governance and the Problem of Social Diversity: 2. Social distance and self-enforcing exchange
  • 3. The laws of lawlessness
  • Part II. Self-Governance and the Problem of Violence: 4. Trading with bandits
  • 5. Efficient plunder
  • Part III. Social-Governance and the Problem of 'Bad Apples': 6. Pirates' private order
  • 7. Criminal constitutions
  • Part IV. Self-Governance as Superior to the State: 8. Efficient anarchy
  • 9. Better off stateless
  • 10. An argument for anarchy in LDCs
  • 11. A future for thinking about self-governance.

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Details

  • NCID
    BB15426608
  • ISBN
    • 9781107025806
  • LCCN
    2013024739
  • Country Code
    us
  • Title Language Code
    eng
  • Text Language Code
    eng
  • Place of Publication
    New York
  • Pages/Volumes
    xi, 256 p.
  • Size
    24 cm
  • Classification
  • Subject Headings
  • Parent Bibliography ID
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