Epistemic norms : new essays on action, belief, and assertion
著者
書誌事項
Epistemic norms : new essays on action, belief, and assertion
Oxford University Press, 2014
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注記
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Epistemic norms play an increasingly important role in many current debates in epistemology and beyond. Paramount among these are debates about belief, action, and assertion. Three primary questions organize the literature. What epistemic requirements constrain appropriate belief? What epistemic requirements constrain appropriate assertion? What epistemic requirements constrain appropriate action? With the tremendous but disparate growth of the literature on
epistemic norms, the time is ripe for a volume bringing together papers by established and emerging figures, with an eye toward the interconnections among our three questions. That is precisely what this volume seeks to do.
目次
- Introduction
- 1. Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm
- 2. Lenient Accounts of Warranted Assertability
- 3. Having False Reasons
- 4. On Knowing One's Reason
- 5. Knowledge versus Truth
- 6. Epistemic Normativity
- 7. The Unity of Reason
- 8. Epistemic Luck, Safety, and Assertion
- 9. Epistemic Agency and Judgment
- 10. You Gotta Believe
- 11. The Spectra of Epistemic Norms
- 12. Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action
- 13. The Dual-Aspect Norms of Belief and Assertion: A Virtue Approach to Epistemic Norms
- Index
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