The failure of counterinsurgency : why hearts and minds are seldom won

著者

• Eland, Ivan

書誌事項

The failure of counterinsurgency : why hearts and minds are seldom won

Ivan Eland

（Praeger security international）

Praeger, an imprint of ABC-CLIO, c2013

注記

Includes bibliographical references (p. [175]-179) and index

内容説明・目次

内容説明

This book examines the implications of counterinsurgency warfare for U.S. defense policy and makes the compelling argument that the United States' default position on counterinsurgency wars should be to avoid them. Given the unsatisfactory outcomes of the counterinsurgency (COIN) wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military is now in a heated debate over whether wars involving COIN operations are worth fighting. This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of COIN through key historic episodes and concludes that the answer is an emphatic "no," based on a dominant record of U.S. military or political failure, and inconsistency in the reasons for the rare cases of success. The author also examines the implications of his findings for U.S. foreign policy, defense policy, and future weapons procurement.

目次

1 Introduction: Quagmire: The Usual Outcome of Counterinsurgency Warfare What Is an Insurgency? Guerrillas Have the Advantage in COIN Wars Guerrillas Not Winning the Support of the People Is Rare Governments Disregard History and Continue to Jump into COIN Wars 2 When to Battle Insurgents The Different Types of Guerrilla Wars Losing COIN Both Militarily and Politically Winning COIN Militarily, but Losing Politically Losing COIN Militarily, but Winning a Larger Conflict COIN War Ending in Negotiated Settlement or Concessions by COIN Forces Closely Examining the Minority of Cases in which COIN Forces Won Both Militarily and Politically Conclusion 3 Classic COIN Strategy Scorched Earth Sometimes Succeeds In the Modern World, a Classical COIN Strategy Is Probably Best But COIN Doesn't Always Work Insurgency More Cost Effective Than Counterinsurgency A Classic COIN Strategy Requires More Forces Than Does Blasting Rebels Conclusion 4 COIN and Compromise Successful Episodes Involving Concessions or Compromise Missed Opportunities Conclusion 5 The Disadvantage of Foreign Occupiers A Nationalist Reaction Against Foreign Occupation Can Make Revolt Potent Nationalist-Based Insurgencies Are the Most Effective Even Factionalized Nationalist Movements Can Win a Guerrilla War Governments Can Occasionally Hold the Nationalist Card Vis-a-Vis Guerrillas But It Doesn't Always Take Nationalist Movements to Win Guerrilla Wars Guerrillas Have Advantages in Propaganda Use Foreign Occupiers Are Rarely Given the Benefit of the Doubt by Locals ... And Some Local Guerrillas Can (Literally) Get Away with Murder Foreign Occupiers Are Handicapped by Poor Knowledge of Local Conditions If Foreign Forces Are Used Instead of Training Local Ones, Winning Is Problematical The Advantage of Local Forces Compared to an Outsider Conclusion 6 The Guerrilla Advantage Despite Advances in Technology, Guerrillas Retain Advantages Guerrillas May Try to Provoke COIN Forces into an Overreaction Conclusion 7 COIN Forces' Advantages: Firepower, Numbers, and Technology COIN Forces' Use of Excessive Firepower Often Backfires Targeted Killings of Guerrilla Leaders May Backfire as a COIN Strategy Scorched Earth Policies Can Sometimes Work Sometimes Even Benevolent Policies Are Not Successful Lack of Political Will Can Be a Problem in COIN Expanding Indigenous Forces to Take Over Can Be Difficult COIN Forces May Develop Tactical Innovations but Still Lose the War Waging COIN Is a Difficult Balancing Act Conclusion 8 Time Favors the Insurgents Guerrillas Are Often in No Hurry Some Insurgents Are Still Waiting Trying to Win Too Quickly Can Hurt Insurgents A Key Center of Gravity Is Public Support for the COIN War at Home Foreign COIN Forces Are Challenged Because Their Time Is Likely Fleeting Conclusion 9 COIN Wars: The Political Aspects Local Governments Engaged in COIN Likely Already Suffer Legitimacy Problems Military Organizations' Forte Is Not the Armed Social Work Needed for COIN Instituting Democracy Is Often a Facade and Isn't Always a Plus for COIN Warfare The Results of Even Fair Elections Are Not Always Predictable COIN Often Unwisely Tries to Strengthen Local Central Government Conclusion 10 The Guerrilla Win and External Support Guerrillas Who Won Militarily or Politically Without External Aid Even Without External Aid Some Rebels Persevere Walls Can Be Effective in Keeping Out Aid and Fighters, But Not Permanently Guerrillas Who Likely Could Have Won Without External Aid Could Losers Win With External Assistance? Assisting the Enemy Conclusion 11 The United States and Politically Dominated Wars Politics of Weapons Buying Stops Great Powers from Equipping for COIN Conclusion 12 Prospects for Pending COIN Wars U.S. Occupation of Iraq U.S. Occupation of Afghanistan Counterinsurgency From the Air: The Drone Wars in Yemen and Somalia The General War on Terror Conclusion 13 U.S. Track Record on COIN: Implications for Forces and Weapons U.S. Vital Interests Do Not Usually Require COIN Warfare What about the Unlikely Scenario of a Necessary COIN War? Conclusion 14 The Domestic Effects of Overseas Counterinsurgency Wars Vietnam War The War on Terror Conclusion Bibliography Index About the Author

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詳細情報

• NII書誌ID(NCID): BB15606789
• ISBN:
  • 9781440830099
• LCCN: 2013008154
• 出版国コード: us
• タイトル言語コード: eng
• 本文言語コード: eng
• 出版地: Santa Barbara, Calif.
• ページ数/冊数: viii, 188 p.
• 大きさ: 25 cm
• 分類:
  • LCC : U241
  • DC23 : 355.02/18
• 件名:
  • LCSH : Counterinsurgency
• 親書誌ID:
  • BB02217729