The dynamics of norms
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
The dynamics of norms
(Cambridge studies in probability, induction, and decision theory)
Cambridge University Press, 2009
- : pbk
Available at 3 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Note
Originally published: 1997
Includes bibliographical references
Description and Table of Contents
Description
In the social sciences norms are sometimes taken to play a key explanatory role. Yet norms differ from group to group, from society to society, and from species to species. How are norms formed and how do they change? This 'state-of-the-art' collection of essays presents some of the best contemporary research into the dynamic processes underlying the formation, maintenance, metamorphosis and dissolution of norms. The volume combines formal modelling with more traditional analysis, and considers biological and cultural evolution, individual learning, and rational deliberation. In filling a significant gap in the current literature this volume will be of particular interest to economists, political scientists and sociologists, in addition to philosophers of the social sciences.
Table of Contents
- 1. The evolution of strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma Robert Axelrod
- 2. Learning to co-operate Cristina Bicchieri
- 3. On the dynamics of social norms Pier Luigi Sacco
- 4. Learning and efficiency in common interest signalling games David Canning
- 5. Learning on a Torus Luca Anderlini and Antonella Ianni
- 6. Evolutive vs. naive Bayesian learning Immanuel M. Bomze and Jurgen Eichberger
- 7. Learning and mixed strategy equilibria in evolutionary games Vincent P. Crawford
- 8. Bayesian learning in games: a non-Bayesian perspective J. S. Jordan
- 9. Savage-Bayesian agents play a repeated game Yaw Nyarko
- 10. Chaos and the explanatory significance of equilibrium: strange attractors in evolutionary game theory Brian Skyrms.
by "Nielsen BookData"