Kant's anatomy of the intelligent mind

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書誌事項

Kant's anatomy of the intelligent mind

Wayne Waxman

Oxford University Press, c2014

  • : hardback

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注記

Includes bibliographical references and index

内容説明・目次

内容説明

In a 2005 editorial in the British newspaper The Guardian, Kant was declared "the undefeated heavyweight philosophy champion of the world" because he had the "insight ... to remove psychology from epistemology, arguing that knowledge is inevitably mediated by space, time and forms within our minds." This is an accurate reflection of the consensus view of philosophers and scientists that Kant's accounts of space, time, nature, mathematics, and logic on the Critique of Pure Reason are rationalist, normativist, and nativist. Here, Wayne Waxman argues that this is untrue. Kant neither asserted nor implied that Euclid and Newton are the final word in their respective sciences. Rather than supposing that the psyche derives its fundamental forms from epistemology, he traced the first principles of ordinary, scientific, mathematical, and even logical knowledge to the psyche. Aristotelean logic, in particular, exhausts the sphere of the logical for Kant precisely because he deduced it entirely from psychological principles of the unity of consciousness, resulting in a demarcation of logic from mathematics that would set virtually everything regarded as logic today on the mathematical side of the ledger. Although Kant derived his conception of the unity of consciousness from Descartes, he gave it new life by eliminating its epistemological and metaphysical baggage, reducing it to its logical essence, and grounding what remained on a wholly original conception of the a priori unity of sensibility. Thus, far from departing from the course charted by British Empiricism, Kant's anatomy of the understanding is continuous with, indeed the culmination of, the psychologization of philosophy initiated by Locke, advanced by Berkeley, and developed to its empirical outrance by Hume. "This is a superb and very important book. It is certainly one of the best books written on Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason." -Klaus Steigleder, Professor of Applied Ethics, Ruhr-Universitat Bochum.

目次

  • Acknowledgements
  • Reference scheme and abbreviations
  • MEMO TO READERS: Overview and Synopsis
  • PART I: TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY PSYCHOLOGIZED
  • Chapter 1: The Psychological a priori
  • Chapter 2: Kant's debt to British Empiricism
  • A. Kant's debt to Locke: sensibilism and subjectivism
  • B. The psychological nature of the Kantian synthetic a priori
  • C. Kant's debt to Berkeley: the separability principle
  • D. Kant's first debt to Hume: the problem of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments
  • E. Kant's second debt to Hume: the psychologistic key to solving <"Hume's problem>"
  • F. Postscript on knowing Hume so as to be able to know Kant
  • PART II: KANT'S PSYCHOLOGISTIC EXPLICATION OF THE POSSIBILITY AND FORMS OF SENSIBILITY
  • Chapter 3: Unity of sensibility (1): sensation, intuition, and appearance
  • A. The place of sensations in transcendental philosophy: a priori synopsis
  • B. The matter of appearances
  • C. The metaphysical exposition of pure intuition
  • D. The problem of unity of sensibility and its general solution
  • E. Appearances and the imagination's synthesis of apprehension in intuition
  • Chapter 4: Unity of sensibility (2): space and time
  • A. Why unity of sensibility requires space and time rather than space alone
  • B. Space as the ground of unity of sensibility with respect to sensations (the manifold of the
  • outer senses)
  • C. Time out of mind: completing the unity of sensibility
  • D. The psychology of appearance and the appearance of the psychological
  • Chapter 5: A new understanding of understanding
  • A. Apperception without the categories
  • B. The individuality of space and time as a prediscursive expression of original apperception
  • C. Formal intuition and the need for prediscursive understanding
  • D. The objective unity of space and time
  • E. Formal intuitions and forms of intuition
  • F. Conceptualist construals of formal intuition
  • G. Synoptic overview of the evidence for prediscursive, precategorial apperception
  • Chapter 6: Mathematics and the unity of sensibility
  • A. Isolating pure intuition from sensation and understanding
  • B. The role of pure intuition in geometry
  • C. The role of pure intuition in arithmetic
  • D. The role of pure intuition in algebra
  • E. Is mathematical logic mathematics or logic?
  • Chapter 7: Idealism and realism
  • A. Outline of the development of idealism up to Kant
  • B. Appearance vs. illusion
  • C. Appearance and reality
  • Chapter 8: Things in themselves: a Kantian refutation of Berkeley's idealism
  • A. Berkeley's esse is percipi idealism
  • B. Perception as product of imagination: the thin edge of the wedge of a Kantian refutation of
  • esse is percipi idealism
  • C. Kant's ground for denying the second component of esse is percipi idealism
  • D. Kant's ground for denying the first component of esse is percipi idealism
  • E. Does Kant's affirmation of things in themselves pass critical muster?
  • F. The representing subject
  • G. Representation vs. thing and in itself: Kant's fundamental ontological divide
  • PART III: KANT'S PSYCHOLOGISTIC EXPLICATION OF THE POSSIBILITY AND FORMS OF THOUGHT
  • Chapter 9: Concepts in mind
  • A. Language and mind: pre-Kantian perspectives
  • B. The synthetic and analytic unity of apperception
  • C. How the analytic unity of the I think converts ordinary representations into universals
  • D. The logical underpinnings of Kant's response to Hume's skeptical challenge
  • Chapter 10: A defense of Kant's table of judgments
  • A. Kant's psychological approach to the logic of judgment
  • B. The logical quality and quantity of the logical relation of categorical judgment
  • C. Is the truth-functional propositional calculus logic or mathematics?
  • D. The logical forms of modality and relation
  • E. Kant's psychologization of logical form
  • Chapter 11: The Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories
  • A. Logical functions utilized as concepts: the derivation of the categories of substance and
  • accident, quantity, and quality
  • B. Logical functions utilized as concepts: the derivation of the categories of cause and effect,
  • community, and modality
  • C. The categories as pure concepts of objects
  • PART IV: KANT'S PSYCHOLOGISTIC EXPLICATION OF THE POSSIBILITY AND FORMS OF COGNIZABLE OBJECTS
  • Chapter 12: Interpreting the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories
  • A. How the Transcendental Deduction of the categories constitutes a quid juris
  • B. The subjective and objective transcendental deductions of the categories
  • C. The MFPNS Preface footnote
  • D. Why a subjective transcendental deduction is necessary
  • Chapter 13: The A edition transcendental deduction: objects as concepts of the necessary synthetic unity of the manifold
  • A. Synthesis before analysis
  • B. The three-fold synthesis: Kant's psychology of experience
  • C. Synthesis of recognition in a concept
  • D. The objectivity problem: why association presupposes affinity
  • E. How the subject of intuition becomes the subject of experience
  • F. The objectivity of the categories and Kant's self-created problem
  • G. Objects explicated as concepts
  • H. The objective unity of apperception
  • I. Summary recapitulation of Kant's reasoning in the Transcendental Deduction
  • Chapter 14: The B edition transcendental deduction: objective unity of apperception and transcendental synthesis
  • A. Judgment and the objective unity of apperception
  • B. Synthesis intellectualis as ground of the objective unity of apperception
  • C. Categorial necessity and its limits
  • D. The relation of transcendental synthesis speciosa to formal intuition
  • E. Appendix: General logic revisited
  • Chapter 15: A category by category elucidation of the transcendental synthesis speciosa of pure formal intuition
  • A. The reasons a category-by-category elucidation is needed
  • B. Space as permanent substratum of temporal succession: the synthesis speciosa of the
  • categories of substance-accident and actuality
  • C. From causal nexus to spatio-temporal nexus: the synthesis speciosa of the categories of
  • cause and effect and possibility
  • D. All conditions met: the synthesis speciosa of the categories of community and necessity
  • E. Number and the synthesis speciosa of the categories of quantity
  • F. Limited and unlimited pure space and time: the synthesis speciosa of the categories of
  • quality
  • G. Results
  • PART V: KANT'S PSYCHOLOGISTIC EXPLICATION OF THE POSSIBILITY AND FORMS OF NATURE
  • Chapter 16: Subsuming reality: schematism and transcendental judgment
  • A. Transcendental judgment
  • B. Why a transcendental schematism is necessary
  • C. The transcendental schemata
  • D. From transcendental schemata to principles of pure understanding
  • Chapter 17: Time out of mind: Kant's system of principles of pure understanding
  • A. Constitutive mathematical and regulative dynamical principles
  • B. The unity of experience in Kant and Hume
  • C. Hume's quandary revisited: the problem of existence in time
  • D. Permanent substances
  • E. Causality and the time series
  • F. How the Second Analogy overcomes the limits of induction: Kant's refutation of Hume's
  • empiricist account of causation
  • G. Causality and the possibility of continuants
  • H. The causal nexus of continuants and permanents
  • I. Kant's principle of community: translating pure space and time into the field of appearance
  • Chapter 18: Our place in nature and its place in us
  • A. The embodied empirical subject
  • B. Community of substances, community of apperception
  • C. Ontology as immanent thinking
  • D. Objectivity and subjectivity: the Postulates of Empirical Thought
  • CONCLUSION: Reversing the frame
  • A. Kant and the philosophy of mind
  • B. Kant and the sciences of mind
  • Bibliography
  • Index

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