Foreign and domestic investment in Argentina : the politics of privatized infrastructure
著者
書誌事項
Foreign and domestic investment in Argentina : the politics of privatized infrastructure
Cambridge University Press, 2014
- : hardback
大学図書館所蔵 全3件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
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  東京
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  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
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  タイ
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注記
Originally issued as the author's thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University
Includes bibliographical references (p. 229-243) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Political economy scholarship suggests that private sector investment, and thus economic growth, is more likely to occur when formal institutions allow states to provide investors with credible commitments to protect property rights. This book argues that this maxim does not hold for infrastructure privatization programs. Rather, differences in firm organizational structure better explain the viability of privatization contracts in weak institutional environments. Domestic investors - or, if contracts are granted subnationally, domestic investors with diverse holdings in their contract jurisdiction - work most effectively in the volatile economic and political environments of the developing world. They are able to negotiate mutually beneficial adaptations to their contracts with host governments because cross-sector diversification provides them with informal contractual supports. The book finds strong empirical support for this argument through an analysis of fourteen water and sanitation privatization contracts in Argentina and a statistical analysis of sector trends in developing countries.
目次
- Introduction
- 1. Informal contractual supports in weak institutional environments
- 2. An overview of the Argentine privatizations
- 3. The fragility of nonlocal contracts prior to the crisis
- 4. Smoother sailing for all investors in less competitive provinces
- 5. Home court advantages magnify after the crisis
- 6. Diverse local holdings also prevail in calm political contexts
- 7. Explaining contractual resilience in low- and middle-income countries
- 8. Conclusion.
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