Knowing the adversary : leaders, intelligence, and assessment of intentions in international relations
著者
書誌事項
Knowing the adversary : leaders, intelligence, and assessment of intentions in international relations
（Princeton studies in international history and politics）
Princeton University Press, c2014
- : hardback
- : pbk
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
States are more likely to engage in risky and destabilizing actions such as military buildups and preemptive strikes if they believe their adversaries pose a tangible threat. Yet despite the crucial importance of this issue, we don't know enough about how states and their leaders draw inferences about their adversaries' long-term intentions. Knowing the Adversary draws on a wealth of historical archival evidence to shed new light on how world leaders and intelligence organizations actually make these assessments. Keren Yarhi-Milo examines three cases: Britain's assessments of Nazi Germany's intentions in the 1930s, America's assessments of the Soviet Union's intentions during the Carter administration, and the Reagan administration's assessments of Soviet intentions near the end of the Cold War. She advances a new theoretical framework--called selective attention--that emphasizes organizational dynamics, personal diplomatic interactions, and cognitive and affective factors. Yarhi-Milo finds that decision makers don't pay as much attention to those aspects of state behavior that major theories of international politics claim they do.
Instead, they tend to determine the intentions of adversaries on the basis of preexisting beliefs, theories, and personal impressions. Yarhi-Milo also shows how intelligence organizations rely on very different indicators than decision makers, focusing more on changes in the military capabilities of adversaries. Knowing the Adversary provides a clearer picture of the historical validity of existing theories, and broadens our understanding of the important role that diplomacy plays in international security.
目次
Acknowledgments ix Introduction 1 Chapter 1 Theories of Intentions and the Problem of Attention 14 Chapter 2 I ndicators of Nazi Germany's Intentions and the Coming of World War II, 1934-39 44 Chapter 3 British Decision Makers' Perceptions of Nazi Germany's Intentions 58 Chapter 4 The British Intelligence Community's Assessments of Nazi Germany's Intentions 102 Chapter 5 The Carter Era and the Collapse of Detente, 1977-80 114 Chapter 6 US Decision Makers' Perceptions of Soviet Intentions: The Collapse of Detente 126 Chapter 7 The US Intelligence Community's Assessments of Soviet Intentions: The Collapse of Detente 158 Chapter 8 I ndicators of Soviet Intentions and the End of the Cold War, 1985-88 178 Chapter 9 US Decision Makers' Perceptions of Soviet Intentions: The End of the Cold War 192 Chapter 10 The US Intelligence Community's Assessments of Soviet Intentions: The End of the Cold War 224 Chapter 11 S ummary and Implications 241 Appendix: Summary of Hypotheses 255 Notes 259 Index 345
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