Israeli peacemaking since 1967 : factors behind the breakthroughs and failures
著者
書誌事項
Israeli peacemaking since 1967 : factors behind the breakthroughs and failures
(UCLA Center for Middle East Development (CMED) series / series editors, Steven Spiegel and Elizabeth Matthews, 7)
Routledge, 2015
- : pbk
大学図書館所蔵 件 / 全1件
-
該当する所蔵館はありません
- すべての絞り込み条件を解除する
注記
Bibliography: p. [218]-227
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Examining the Israeli-Arab conflict as an "intractable conflict," Israeli Peacemaking since 1967 seeks to determine just which factors, or combination of factors, impacted on Israel's position in past peace-making efforts, possibly accounting for breakthroughs or failures to reach agreement.
From King Hussein's little known overtures immediately after the Six-Day War, through President Sadat's futile efforts to avoid war in the early 1970s, to repeated third-party-mediated talks with Syria, factors including deep-seated mistrust, leadership style, and domestic political spoilers contributed to failures even as public opinion and international circumstances may have been favourable. How these and other factors intervened, changed or were handled, allowing for the few breakthroughs (with Egypt and Jordan) or the near breakthrough of the Annapolis process with the Palestinians, provides not only an understanding of the past but possible keys for future Israeli-Arab peace efforts.
Employing extensive use of archival material, as well as interviews and thorough research of available sources, this book provides insight on just which factors, or combination of factors, account for breakthroughs or failures to reach agreement; a framework useful for examining both the Israeli-Arab conflict and intractable conflicts in general.
目次
Introduction 1 1967-68 Failure 2 Breakthrough with Egypt 3 Failure on the Syrian Track 4 Jordan Again 5 Oslo I - Breakthrough and Failure 6 Oslo II - Barak and Camp David 7 Olmert's Near-Breakthroughs: Annapolis Process and Syrian Talks Conclusion
「Nielsen BookData」 より