Why governments and parties manipulate elections : theory, practice, and implications

Bibliographic Information

Why governments and parties manipulate elections : theory, practice, and implications

Alberto Simpser

(Political economy of institutions and decisions)

Cambridge University Press, 2014

  • : pbk

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Note

Includes bibliographical references (p. 245-271) and index

Description and Table of Contents

Description

Why do parties and governments cheat in elections they cannot lose? This book documents the widespread use of blatant and excessive manipulation of elections and explains what drives this practice. Alberto Simpser shows that, in many instances, elections are about more than winning. Electoral manipulation is not only a tool used to gain votes, but also a means of transmitting or distorting information. This manipulation conveys an image of strength, shaping the behavior of citizens, bureaucrats, politicians, parties, unions and businesspeople to the benefit of the manipulators, increasing the scope for the manipulators to pursue their goals while in government and mitigating future challenges to their hold on power. Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections provides a general theory about what drives electoral manipulation and empirically documents global patterns of manipulation.

Table of Contents

  • Preface: more than winning
  • 1. Introduction and overview
  • 2. Electoral manipulation: what it is and how to measure it
  • 3. The puzzle of excessive and blatant manipulation
  • 4. More than winning: the consequences of excessive and blatant electoral manipulation
  • 5. The strategic logic of electoral manipulation
  • 6. The theory at work: evidence from case studies
  • 7. Indirect effects of electoral manipulation: quantitative evidence
  • 8. Conclusion.

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Details

  • NCID
    BB17560135
  • ISBN
    • 9781107448681
  • Country Code
    us
  • Title Language Code
    eng
  • Text Language Code
    eng
  • Place of Publication
    New York
  • Pages/Volumes
    xix, 282 p.
  • Size
    24 cm
  • Classification
  • Subject Headings
  • Parent Bibliography ID
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