Corruption as a last resort : adapting to the market in Central Asia
著者
書誌事項
Corruption as a last resort : adapting to the market in Central Asia
Cornell University Press, 2014
大学図書館所蔵 全8件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Why do ordinary people engage in corruption? In Corruption as a Last Resort, Kelly M. McMann contends that bureaucrats, poverty, and culture do not force individuals in Central Asia to pay bribes, use connections, or sell political support. Rather, corruption is a last resort when relatives, groups in society, the market, and formal government programs cannot provide essential goods and services. Using evidence from her long-term research in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, McMann shows that Islamic institutions, secular charities, entrepreneurs, and banks cannot provide the jobs and credit people need. This drives individuals to illicitly seek employment and loans from government officials.
A leading cause of this resource scarcity is market reform, as demonstrated by McMann's analysis of these countries as well as of Uzbekistan and global data. Market reform without supporting institutions, such as credit registries and antimonopoly measures, limits the resources available from the market and societal groups. McMann finds that in these circumstances only those individuals who have affluent relatives have an alternative to corruption. By focusing on ordinary people, McMann offers a new understanding of corruption. Previously, our knowledge was largely restricted to government officials' role in illicit exchanges. From her novel approach comes a useful policy insight: supplying ordinary people with alternatives to corruption is a fundamental and important anticorruption strategy.
目次
1. An Absence of Alternatives: A New Framework for Understanding Corruption2. Alternatives to Corruption and the Effect of Market Reform: The Arguments and Their Theoretical Implications3. Bribery, Favoritism, and Clientelism: Evidence from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan4. Market Actors as an Unrealized Alternative: The Effect of Market Reforms5. Islamic Institutions and Secular Charities: Obstacles to Providing Substitute Resources6. Families: The Uneven Effect of Market Reforms7. Reducing Corruption: Policy RecommendationsAppendix: Statistical Analysis
Index
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