Controlling the World Bank and IMF : shareholders, stakeholders, and the politics of concessional lending
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Controlling the World Bank and IMF : shareholders, stakeholders, and the politics of concessional lending
(International political economy series)
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013
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Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 190-209) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Liam Clegg provides an innovative reading of where power lies in the institutions' concessional lending operations, drawing its focus on shareholders and stakeholders from staffs' own understandings of their operational environments.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction 2. Shareholder Control and the Rise of Poverty Reduction at the World Bank 3. Shareholder Conflicts and the Rise of Social Spending at the IMF 4. The World Bank and the Reconstruction of Stakeholder Engagement 5. Apolitical Economy and the Limits to Stakeholder Engagement at the IMF 6. Conclusion
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