Evolution of the social contract

Author(s)

Bibliographic Information

Evolution of the social contract

Brian Skyrms

Cambridge University Press, 2014

2nd ed

  • : pbk
  • : hbk

Available at  / 4 libraries

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Note

Includes bibliographical references (p. 127-144) and index

Description and Table of Contents

Description

In this new edition of Evolution of the Social Contract, Brian Skyrms uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the genesis of social contracts and investigates social phenomena including justice, communication, altruism, and bargaining. Featuring new material on evolution and information transfer, and including recent developments in game theory and evolution literature, his book introduces and applies appropriate concepts of equilibrium and evolutionary dynamics, showing how key issues can be modeled as games and considering the ways in which evolution sometimes supports, and sometimes does not support, rational choice. He discusses topics including how bargaining with neighbors promotes sharing of resources, the diversity of behavior in ultimatum bargaining in small societies, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and an investigation into signaling games and the spontaneous emergence of meaningful communication. His book will be of great interest to readers in philosophy of science, social science, evolutionary biology, game and decision theory, and political theory.

Table of Contents

  • Preface to the second edition
  • Preface to the original edition
  • Acknowledgments
  • 1. Sex and justice
  • 2. Fairness and commitment
  • 3. Mutual aid
  • 4. Correlated convention
  • 5. The evolution of meaning
  • Postscript
  • Notes
  • References
  • Index.

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Details

  • NCID
    BB18313200
  • ISBN
    • 9781107434288
    • 9781107077287
  • LCCN
    2014025188
  • Country Code
    uk
  • Title Language Code
    eng
  • Text Language Code
    eng
  • Place of Publication
    Cambridge
  • Pages/Volumes
    xvi, 148 p.
  • Size
    22 cm
  • Classification
  • Subject Headings
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