Bounded bureaucracy and the budgetary process in the United States

著者

    • Ryu, Jay Eungha

書誌事項

Bounded bureaucracy and the budgetary process in the United States

Jay Eungha Ryu

Transaction Publishers, c2011

大学図書館所蔵 件 / 全2件

この図書・雑誌をさがす

注記

Includes bibliographical references (p. 197-203) and index

内容説明・目次

内容説明

Bureaucracies have been criticized from various perspectives and blamed for a variety of failings. Critics have claimed that bureaucracies are too focused on conforming to rules rather than achieving an organization's core mission. Bureaucracies are said to oppress human freedom because of their orientation toward hierarchical control. Bureaucratic organizations are also said to be unable to deal effectively with public problems that span multiple administrative jurisdictions; they do not reach beyond their own organizational boundaries. This book provides solid data on how bureaucracies can expedite information processing and reduce organizational conflicts. Jay Eungha Ryu finds that the functions of bureaucracies are highly dependent upon external political conditions. Whether the executive and legislative branches are dominated by the same party significantly influences the ability of bureaucracies to function effectively. Ryu notes that the merits of bureaucratic centralization are worth close attention. Numerous attempts, including performance budgeting systems, have been made to improve bureaucratic malfunctions. However, such reform initiatives are doomed to failure, he argues, unless they employ a core feature of bureaucracy itself, centralization. Ryu defines bureaucratic centralization at its best as bounded bureaucracy. If well managed, bounded bureaucracy can substantially improve the rational behavior of organizations and reduce institutional frictions.

目次

Preface 1 Bureaucraticization of Budget Processes: Causing or Remedying Bounded Rationality? Bounded Rationality of Decision Makers Bounded Bureaucracy as a Remedy to Bounded Rationality Central Budget Offices: Enhancing Information Processing and Reducing Institutional Conflicts Bureaucracy to Save Bureaucratic Malfunctions 2 Bounded Rationality in Policy and Budget Processes Bounded Rationality and Satisficing Incrementalism Serial Judgment Disproportionate Information Processing Conclusion 3 Bureaucratic Organizations as a Remedy to Bounded Rationality Bureaucratic Organizations: Extending Human Cognitive and Analytical Capacities Bureaucratic Centralization: Expediting Information Processing and Reducing Institutional Frictions Bureaucratic Centralization and Moderating Impact of Organizational Strategies Bureaucratic Centralization and Partisan Configurations Conclusion: Bounded Bureaucracy to Bounded Rationality 4 Bureaucratic Centralization and the National Executive Budget Process U.S. Budget Outcomes: 1961-2006 Bureaucratic Centralization in Presidents' Budgets Institutional Frictions in the U.S. Budget Process Bureaucratic Centralization and U.S. Budget Punctuations 81 Bureaucratic Centralization and U.S. Budget Stability Conclusion 5 Bureaucratic Centralization and the Congressional Budget Process Congressional Macrobudgeting: Institutions and Partisan Politics The Congressional Budget Offi ce (CBO): A Bipartisan Information Processor Bureaucratic Centralization and U.S. Budget Punctuations Bureaucratic Centralization and U.S. Budget Stability Conclusion 6 Bureaucratic Centralization and the State Budget Process State Budget Outcomes: 1993, 1996, 1998, and 2000 State Executive Budgets State Legislative Budgets State Budget Institutions: Item Veto and Balanced Budget Requirements Bounded Bureaucracy and the Budgetary Process in the United States Bureaucratic Centralization and State Budget Punctuations Bureaucratic Centralization and State Budget Stability Conclusion Appendix: Legislative Professionalization and State Budget Punctuations and Stability 7 Conclusion: Bounded Bureaucracy to Bounded Rationality Bibliography Index

「Nielsen BookData」 より

詳細情報

ページトップへ