The meaning of 'ought' : beyond descriptivism and expressivism in metaethics

著者

書誌事項

The meaning of 'ought' : beyond descriptivism and expressivism in metaethics

Matthew Chrisman

（Oxford moral theory）

Oxford University Press, c2016

  • : cloth

タイトル別名

The meaning of "ought" : beyond descriptivism and expressivism in metaethics

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注記

Includes bibliographical references and index

内容説明・目次

内容説明

The word 'ought' is one of the core normative terms, but it is also a modal word. In this book Matthew Chrisman develops a careful account of the semantics of 'ought' as a modal operator, and uses this to motivate a novel inferentialist account of why ought-sentences have the meaning that they have. This is a metanormative account that agrees with traditional descriptivist theories in metaethics that specifying the truth-conditions of normative sentences is a central part of the explanation of their meaning. But Chrisman argues that this leaves important metasemantic questions about what it is in virtue of which ought-sentences have the meanings that they have unanswered. His appeal to inferentialism aims to provide a viable anti-descriptivist but also anti-expressivist answer to these questions.

目次

  • 1. Introduction
  • 1.1. The Ubiquity of 'Ought'
  • 1.2. Some Initial Theoretical Cartography
  • 1.3. Metanormative Theorizing and the Philosophy of Language
  • 1.4. Compositional Semantics, Some Basics
  • 1.5. The Word 'Ought'
  • 1.6. Plan
  • 2. 'Ought's, Obligations, Reasons, and Values
  • 2.1. Introduction
  • 2.2. Formal Framework and Toy Analysis of 'Ought'
  • 2.3. An Initial Ambiguity View
  • 2.4. Analyzing 'Ought' in Terms of Reasons
  • 2.5. Analyzing 'Ought' in Terms of Values
  • 2.6. Conclusion
  • 3. A Possible Worlds Semantics for 'Ought'
  • 3.1. Introduction
  • 3.2. From Modal Logic to Deontic Necessity and Possibility
  • 3.3. From Deontic Necessity to a Simple Possible Worlds Semantics for 'Ought'
  • 3.4. Some Reasons to Complicate the Analysis
  • 3.5. Kratzer's Improvements
  • 3.6. Application of Kratzer's Framework to 'Ought'
  • 3.7. The Weakness of 'Ought' Compared to 'Must'
  • 3.8. Conclusion
  • 4. Problems with Possible Worlds
  • 4.1. Introduction
  • 4.2. The Challenge of Dilemmas
  • 4.3. The Challenge of 'Ought-to-Do'
  • 4.4. Conclusion
  • 5. A New Semantic Rule for 'Ought'
  • 5.1. Introduction
  • 5.2. Is 'Ought' Polysemous between Agentive and Non-Agentive Readings?
  • 5.3. Imperatival Content
  • 5.4. A New Semantic Rule for 'Ought'
  • 5.5. Conclusion
  • 6. Metanormative Debate Renewed
  • 6.1. Introduction
  • 6.2. Truth Conditions as Ways Reality Could Be
  • 6.3. Truth Conditions as What One Ought to Think
  • 6.4. Truth Conditions as Positions in a Space of Implications
  • 6.5. Conclusion
  • 7. Conclusion
  • 7.1. Introduction
  • 7.2. Should the Metalanguage of Metanormative Theory be Nonnormative?
  • 7.3. What about Other Normative and Evaluative Words and Concepts?
  • 7.4. Moral Psychology
  • 7.5. The Epistemology of Normativity
  • 7.6. Conclusion
  • Appendix of Proposed Rules
  • Bibliography

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