Bernard Bosanquet and his friends : letters illustrating the sources and the development of his philosophical opinions

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Bernard Bosanquet and his friends : letters illustrating the sources and the development of his philosophical opinions

edited by J.H. Muirhead

(Muirhead library of philosophy, . 20th century philosophy ; 19)

Routledge, 2014

  • : pbk

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Note

Reprint. Originally published: London : George Allen & Unwin, 1935

Includes bibliographical references and index

Description and Table of Contents

Description

This is Volume XIX of twenty-two in a collection on 20th Century Philosophy. Originally published in 1935, and makes enquiries into the surviving letters of Bosanquet in order to analyse his philosophical opinions.

Table of Contents

Preface, BERTRAND RUSSELL: 1872-1970, 2 PROPOSITIONS AND SENTENCES, 3 RUSSELL'S PARADOX AND SOME OTHERS, 4 A DIAGNOSIS OF THE LIAR AND OTHER SEMANTICAL VICIOUS-CIRCLE PARADOXES, 5 A REFUTATION OF AN UNJUSTIFIED ATTACK ON THE AXIOM OF REDUCIBILITY, 6 ON CONSTRAINED DENOTATION, 7 IS PHILOSOPHY 'AN IDLENESS IN MATHEMATICS'?, 8 POST' Principia, 9 RUSSELL AND MODAL LOGIC, 10 RUSSELL AND BRADLEY ON RELATIONS, 11 ON RUSSELL'S CRITIQUE OF LEIBNIZ'S PHILOSOPHY, 12 ON SOME RELATIONS BETWEEN LEIBNIZ'S MONADOLOGY AND TRANSFINITE SET THEORY: A COMPLEMENT TO RUSSELL'S THESIS ON LEIBNIZ, 13 THE INFINITE, 14 BELIEF AS A PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE, 15 TRUTH, BELIEF AND MODES OF DESCRIPTION, 16 THE CONCERN ABOUT TRUTH, 17 RUSSELL AND THE FORM OF OUTER SENSE, 18 RUSSELL'S THEORY OF PERCEPTION, 19 RUSSELL AND SCHLICK: A REMARKABLE AGREEMENT ON A MONISTIC SOLUTION OF THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM, 20 SELF-ACQUAINTANCE AND THE MEANING OF 'I', 21 SOME ASPECTS OF KNOWLEDGE (I), 22 RUSSELL'S PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNT OF PROBABILITY, 23 FOUNDATIONS, 24 RUSSELL'S ETHICS, 25 RUSSELL'S JUDGEMENT ON BOLSHEVISM, 26 SOLIPSISTIC POLITICS: RUSSELL'S EMPIRICIST LIBERALISM, Index

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