Trust and fear in civil wars : ending intrastate conflicts
著者
書誌事項
Trust and fear in civil wars : ending intrastate conflicts
Lexington Books, c2015
- : cloth
大学図書館所蔵 全1件
注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Why do some civil wars last a long time, while others end relatively quickly? Trust and Fear in Civil Wars examines the conditions under which individuals are willing to lay down their weapons under a settlement agreement. The author argues that wars are easiest to resolve when combatants believe that their adversaries will uphold a deal or that the costs of renewed war will be low. Several key sources of information inform this calculation. Drawing on both cross-national and case study data, including detailed interviews, the book demonstrates that when information suggests either that a peace agreement is likely to break down or that the results of a broken deal will be especially deadly, a settlement leaves combatants too vulnerable to countenance, resulting in wars lasting longer.
目次
Chapter One: Introduction
Chapter Two: Trust and Fears for the Future
Chapter Three: Trust and Fear across Civil Wars
Chapter Four: Sri Lanka: Both Short And Long Civil Wars
Chapter Five: Turkey: Ongoing Conflict With No Settlement
Chapter Six: Cyprus: Frozen Conflict with No Settlement
Chapter Seven: Conclusions
「Nielsen BookData」 より