Economic market design and planning for electric power systems
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Economic market design and planning for electric power systems
（IEEE Press series on power engineering）
Wiley, c2010
- : cloth
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Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Discover cutting-edge developments in electric power systems Stemming from cutting-edge research and education activities in the field of electric power systems, this book brings together the knowledge of a panel of experts in economics, the social sciences, and electric power systems. In ten concise and comprehensible chapters, the book provides unprecedented coverage of the operation, control, planning, and design of electric power systems. It also discusses:
A framework for interdisciplinary research and education
Modeling electricity markets
Alternative economic criteria and proactive planning for transmission investment in deregulated power systems
Payment cost minimization with demand bids and partial capacity cost compensations for day-ahead electricity auctions
Dynamic oligopolistic competition in an electric power network and impacts of infrastructure disruptions
Reliability in monopolies and duopolies
Building an efficient, reliable, and sustainable power system
Risk-based power system planning integrating social and economic direct and indirect costs
Models for transmission expansion planning based on reconfiguration capacitor switching
Next-generation optimization for electric power systems
Most chapters end with a bibliography, closing remarks, conclusions, or future work. Economic Market Design and Planning for Electric Power Systems is an indispensable reference for policy-makers, executives and engineers of electric utilities, university faculty members, and graduate students and researchers in control theory, electric power systems, economics, and the social sciences.
目次
Preface. Contributors.
1. A Framework for Interdisciplinary Research and Education (James Momoh).
1.1 Introduction.
1.2 Power System Challenges.
1.3 Solution of the EPNES Architecture.
1.4 Implementation Strategies for EPNES.
1.5 Test Beds for EPNES.
1.6 Examples of Funded Research Work in Response to the EPNES Solicitation.
1.7 Future Directions of EPNES.
1.8 Conclusions.
Acknowledgements.
Bibliography.
2. Modeling Electricity Markets: A Brief Introduction (Alfredo Garcia, Lamine Mili, and James Momoh).
2.1 Introduction.
2.2 The Basic Structure of a Market for Electricity.
2.3 Modeling Strategic Behavior.
2.4 The Locational Marginal Pricing System of PJM.
2.5 LMP Calculation using Adaptive Dynamic Programming.
2.6 Conclusions.
Bibliography.
3. Alternative Economic Criteria and Proactive Planning for Transmission Investment in Deregulated Power Systems (Enzo E. Sauma and Shmuel S. Oren).
3.1 Introduction.
3.2 Conflict Optimization Objectives for Network Expansions.
3.3 Policy Implications.
3.4 Proactive Transmission Planning.
3.5 Illustrative Example.
3.6 Conclusions and Future Work.
Bibliography.
Appendix.
4. Payment Cost Minimization with Demand Bids and Partial Capacity Cost Compensations for Day-Ahead Electricity Auctions (Peter B. Luh, Ying Chen, Joseph H. Yan, Gary A. Stern, William E. Blankson, and Feng Zhao).
4.1 Introduction.
4.2 Literature Review.
4.3 Problem Formulation.
4.4 Solution Methodology.
4.5 Results and Insights.
4.6 Conclusions.
Acknowledgement.
Bibliography.
5. Dynamic Oligopolistic Competition in an Electric Power Network and Impacts of Infrastructure Disruptions (Reetabrata Mookherjee, Benjamin F. Hobbs, Terry L. Friesz and Matthew A. Rigdon).
5.1 Introduction and Motivation.
5.2 Summary and Modeling Approach.
5.3 Model Description.
5.4 Formulation of NCP.
5.5 Numerical Example.
5.6 Conclusions and Future Work.
Acknowledgement.
Appendix: Glossary of Relevant Terms form Electricity Economics.
Bibliography.
6. Reliability in Monopolies and Duopolies: A Comparison of Market Outcomes with Socially Optimal Levels (George Deltas and Christoforos Hadjicostis).
6.1 Introduction.
6.2 Modeling Framework.
6.3 Profit Maximization Outcome of a Monopolistic Generator.
6.4 Nash Equilibrium in a Duopolistic Market Structure.
6.5 Social Optimum.
6.6 Comparison of Equilibria and Discussion.
6.7 Asymmetric Maintenance Policies.
6.8 Conclusion.
Acknowledgement.
Bibliography.
7. Building an Efficient Reliable and Sustainable Power System: An Interdisciplinary Approach (James A. Momoh , Philip Fanara Jr., Haydar Kurban,and L. Jide Iwarere).
7.1 Introduction.
7.2 Overview of Concepts.
7.3 Theoretical Foundations: Theoretical Support for Handling Contingencies.
7.4 Design Methodologies.
7.5 Implementation Approach.
7.6 Implementation Results.
7.7 Conclusion.
Acknowledgements.
Bibliography.
8. Risk-Based Power System Planning Integrating Social and Economic Direct and Indirect Costs (Lamine Mili and Kevin Dooley).
8.1 Introduction.
8.2 The Partitioned Multiobjective Risk Method.
8.3 Partitioned Mutiobjective Risk Method Applied to Power System Planning.
8.4 Integrating the Social and Economic Impacts in Power System Planning.
8.5 Energy Crises and Public Crises.
8.6 Conclusions and Future Work.
Bibliography.
9. Models for Transmission Expansion Planning based on Reconfigurable Capacitor Switching (James McCalley, Ratnesh Kumar, V. Ajjarapu, Oscar Volij, H. Liu, L. Jin, and Wen Shang).
9.1 Introduction.
9.2 Planning Processes.
9.3 Transmission Limits.
9.4 Decision Support Models.
9.5 Market Efficiency and Transmission Investment.
9.6 Summary.
Acknowledgements.
Bibliography.
10. Next Generation Optimization for Electric Power Systems (James A. Momoh).
10.1 Introduction.
10.2 Structure of the Next Generation of Optimization.
10.3 Foundation of the Next Generation Optimization.
10.4 Application of Next Generation Optimization to Power Systems.
10.5 Grant Challenges in Next Generation Optimization and Research Needs.
10.6 Concluding Remarks and Benchmarks Problems.
Acknowledgment.
Bibliography.
Index.
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