The price of a vote in the Middle East : clientelism and communal politics in Lebanon and Yemen
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
The price of a vote in the Middle East : clientelism and communal politics in Lebanon and Yemen
(Cambridge studies in comparative politics)
Cambridge University Press, 2016
- : hardback
Available at 4 libraries
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  Iwate
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National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies Library (GRIPS Library)
: hardback314.892||C8801408450
-
Library, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization図
: hardbackME||324||P11908150
Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 235-252) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Clientelism and ethnic favoritism appear to go hand in hand in many diverse societies in the developing world. However, while some ethnic communities receive generous material rewards for their political support, others receive very modest payoffs. The Price of a Vote in the Middle East examines this key - and often overlooked - component of clientelism. The author draws on elite interviews and original survey data collected during his years of field research in Lebanon and Yemen; two Arab countries in which political constituencies follow sectarian, regional, and tribal divisions. He demonstrates that voters in internally-competitive communal groups receive more, and better, payoffs for their political support than voters trapped in uncompetitive groups dominated by a single, hegemonic leader. Ultimately, politicians provide services when compelled by competitive pressures to do so, whereas leaders sheltered from competition can, and do, take their supporters for granted.
Table of Contents
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Ethnic constituencies
- 3. Communal politics in Lebanon
- 4. Communal politics in Yemen
- 5. Contemporary clientelism
- 6. Captive audiences and public services
- 7. Intermingled vote markets
- 8. Perverse competition
- 9. Conclusion.
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