Action reconceptualized : human agency and its sources
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書誌事項
Action reconceptualized : human agency and its sources
Lexington Books, c2016
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注記
Bibliography: p. 205-209
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
The concept of action that requires philosophical analysis is one that concerns behavior characteristically found in humans. In Action Reconceptualized: Human Agency and Its Sources, David K. Chan examines the sources of human agency that are proposed in causal theories of action-namely desire, intention, and trying-and distinguishes them from each other in terms of their roles in practical reasoning and motivation. He conceptualizes them in relation to each other in a way that is consistent and useful for answering a number of questions that are central to the philosophy of action. The action theory in this book addresses the need to understand human agency for its own sake, but it also serves another purpose. When the philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe stressed the need to do philosophy of action before doing ethical theory, what she meant was that moral philosophers should first work out a proper account of the relationship between the inner states of a person and the actions that she performs. This book provides such an account, and makes the case that it is desire, rather than intention, that is the basis for the ethical evaluation of an agent. Action Reconceptualized will be of particular interest to students and scholars doing research in action theory and ethics, as well as to those working outside of philosophy in psychology and cognitive science.
目次
Preface
Introduction
The Need to Reconceptualize Action
What Needs to be Reconceptualized
Putting the Pieces Together
Chapter 1: Towards a Theory of Action
Philosophy of Action
Causal and Non-Causal Theories
Conceptualizing Action
'Actopia'
Evaluating Action
Fixing the Constants
An Outline of this Book
Chapter 2: Intention
Skepticism about Intention
The Planning Theory of Intention
Intention and Reasons for Acting
Comparing Concepts of Intention
Chapter 3: Desire
Defining Desire
Extrinsic Desire
Desire Ownership
Motivation, Reason, and Akratic Agency
Chapter 4: From Volitions to Tryings
Volitions and the Regress Problem
Why Do Volitionalists Say Strange Things?
A Theory of Tryings
The Identity-Theory of Trying as Mental and Physical
Mental Tryings
The Theoretical Advantage of Conceptualizing Tryings as Processes
Non-Observational Knowledge of Trying
Chapter 5: Problems and Issues in Action Theory
Deviant Causality
The Simple View
Non-Intentional Actions
Basic and Non-Basic Actions
The Nature of Action
Desiring and Intending to Try
Chapter 6: Rational and Moral Agency
The Doctrine of Double Effect
The Moral Significance of Non-Intentional Agency
The Argument Against Ethical Rationalism
Conclusion
The Reconceptualized Action Theory
The Importance of Getting It Right
Bibliography
Index
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