Political economy for public policy

書誌事項

Political economy for public policy

Ethan Bueno de Mesquita

Princeton University Press, c2016

  • : pbk

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注記

Includes bibliographical references (p. [385]-392) and indexes

内容説明・目次

内容説明

This textbook uses modern political economy to introduce students of political science, government, economics, and public policy to the politics of the policymaking process. The book's distinct political economy approach has two virtues. By developing general principles for thinking about policymaking, it can be applied across a range of issue areas. It also unifies the policy curriculum, offering coherence to standard methods for teaching economics and statistics, and drawing connections between fields. The book begins by exploring the normative foundations of policymaking--political theory, social choice theory, and the Paretian and utilitarian underpinnings of policy analysis. It then introduces game theoretic models of social dilemmas--externalities, coordination problems, and commitment problems--that create opportunities for policy to improve social welfare. Finally, it shows how the political process creates technological and incentive constraints on government that shape policy outcomes. Throughout, concepts and models are illustrated and reinforced with discussions of empirical evidence and case studies. This textbook is essential for all students of public policy and for anyone interested in the most current methods influencing policymaking today. * Comprehensive approach to politics and policy suitable for advanced undergraduates and graduate students* Models unify policy curriculum through methodological coherence * Exercises at the end of every chapter* Self-contained appendices cover necessary game theory* Extensive discussion of cases and applications

目次

*Frontmatter, pg. i*Summary of Contents, pg. vii*Policy Applications, pg. xvii*Preface, pg. xix*Introduction, pg. 1*1. Normative Frameworks, pg. 11*2. Collective Goals, pg. 51*3. Pareto Concepts, pg. 74*Summing Up Normative Foundations, pg. 95*4. Externalities, pg. 97*5. Coordination Problems, pg. 150*6. Commitment Problems, pg. 173*Summing Up Social Dilemmas, pg. 191*7. Strategic Adjustment, pg. 193*8. Dynamic Inconsistency, pg. 218*9. The Need for Information, pg. 244*10. Influence over Elected Officials, pg. 282*11. Institutions, Incentives, and Power, pg. 305*Summing Up Constraints on Good Governance, pg. 328*Concluding Reflections on Politics and Policy, pg. 331*A. Utility, Strategic-Form Games, and Nash Equilibrium, pg. 335*B. Extensive-Form Games, pg. 362*Bibliography, pg. 385*Index of Referenced Authors, pg. 393*General Index, pg. 396

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詳細情報

  • NII書誌ID(NCID)
    BB22307449
  • ISBN
    • 9780691168746
  • LCCN
    2015047630
  • 出版国コード
    us
  • タイトル言語コード
    eng
  • 本文言語コード
    eng
  • 出版地
    Princeton, N.J.
  • ページ数/冊数
    xxii, 401 p.
  • 大きさ
    26 cm
  • 分類
  • 件名
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