Game theory and public policy
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Game theory and public policy
Edward Elgar, c2015
2nd ed
- : cased
Available at 10 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
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  Miyazaki
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  Okinawa
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  United States of America
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National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies Library (GRIPS Library)
: cased331.19||Ma1301408860
Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 275-288) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Building on the success of the first edition, Game Theory and Public Policy, Second Edition provides a critical, selective review of key concepts in game theory with a view to their applications in public policy. The author further suggests modifications for some of the models (chiefly in cooperative game theory) to improve their applicability to economics and public policy.
Roger McCain makes use of the analytical tools of game theory for the pragmatic purpose of identifying problems and exploring potential solutions, providing a toolkit for the analysis of public policy allowing for a clearer understanding of the public policy enterprise itself. His critical review of major topics from both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory includes less-known ideas and constructive proposals for new approaches. This revised edition features a new second half that focuses on biform games, combining cooperative and non-cooperative decisions in a simple and natural way to provide a working model of externalities that can be applied to issues such as monopoly policy and labor market policies.
Drawing on comparatively well understood models in cooperative game theory and the author's own research on mathematical models of biform games, this unique approach and treatment of game theory, updated and expanded to stay on the cutting edge, will be a useful resource for students and scholars of economics and public policy, as well as for policymakers themselves.
Table of Contents
Contents: Preface PART I HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL SURVEY 1. Objectives and scope of the book 2. Representing games 3. A brief interpretive history of game theory 4. Nash equilibrium and public policy 5. Correlated equilibrium 6. Noncooperative games in extensive form and public policy 7. Social mechanism design 8. Superadditive games in coalition function form 9. Recall, rationality and political economy PART II MIXED COOPERATIVE AND NONCOOPERATIVE DECISIONS: EXTENSIONS 10. Biform games and considerable solutions 11. The firm as a coalition 12. What coalitions will be formed? 13. Monopoly and monopsony revisited 14. Bargaining and the determination of wages 15. Bargaining power and majority rule References Index
by "Nielsen BookData"