Handbook of social choice and voting

著者

• Heckelman, Jac C.
• Miller, Nicholas R.

書誌事項

Handbook of social choice and voting

edited by Jac C. Heckelman, Nicholas R. Miller

Edward Elgar Publishing, c2015

注記

Includes bibliographical references and index

内容説明・目次

内容説明

This Handbook provides an overview of interdisciplinary research related to social choice and voting that is intended for a broad audience. Expert contributors from various fields present critical summaries of the existing literature, including intuitive explanations of technical terminology and well-known theorems, suggesting new directions for research. Each chapter presents an expository primer on a particular topic or theme within social choice, with the aim of making the material fully accessible to students and scholars in economics, political science, mathematics, philosophy, law and other fields of study. Topics covered include preference aggregation, voting rules, spatial models, methodology and empirical applications. Scholars, graduate students and even advanced undergraduates in a variety of disciplines will find this introductory and relatively non-technical book an indispensable addition to the field. Contributors: J.F. Adams, W.T. Bianco, A. Blais, P.J. Coughlin, K.L. Dougherty, D.S. Felsenthal, T.H. Hammond, C. Hare, J.C. Heckelman, R.G. Holcombe, C. Kam, M.M. Kaminski, M. Machover, B.C. McCannon, I. McLean, N.R. Miller, S. Moser, E.M. Penn, K.T. Poole, R. Ragan, D.G. Saari, I. Sened, R.A. Smyth, N. Tideman

目次

Contents: 1. Introduction: Issues in Social Choice and Voting Jac C. Heckelman and Nicholas R. Miller PART I PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL CHOICE 2. The Strange History of Social Choice Iain McLean 3. Unanimous Consent and Constitutional Economics Randall G. Holcombe 4. Rational Choice and the Calculus of Voting Andre Blais 5. Computational Social Choice Robi Ragan PART II PAIRWISE SOCIAL CHOICE 6. Majority Rule and Tournament Solutions Scott Moser 7. Supermajority Rules Keith L. Dougherty 8. The Measurement of a Priori Voting Power Dan S. Felsenthal and Moshe Machover 9. Condorcet Jury Theorems Bryan C. McCannon PART III SPATIAL MODELS OF SOCIAL CHOICE 10. The Spatial Model of Social Choice and Voting Nicholas R. Miller 11. A Unified Spatial Model of American Political Institutions Thomas H. Hammond 12. Competing for Votes James F. Adams 13. Probabilistic Voting in Models of Electoral Competition Peter J. Coughlin PART IV SOCIAL CHOICE FROM MULTIPLE ALTERNATIVES 14. Arrow's Theorem and Its Descendants Elizabeth Maggie Penn 15. Properties and Paradoxes of Common Voting Rules Jac C. Heckelman 16. Voting Mysteries: A Picture is Worth a Thousand Words Donald G. Saari 17. Multiple-Winner Voting Rules Nicolaus Tideman PART V EMPIRICAL SOCIAL CHOICE 18. Measuring Ideology in Congress Christopher Hare and Keith T. Poole 19. The Uncovered Set and its Applications William T. Bianco, Christopher Kam, Itai Sened and Regina A. Smyth 19. Empirical Examples of Voting Paradoxes Marek M. Kaminski Index

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詳細情報

• NII書誌ID(NCID): BB22749695
• ISBN:
  • 9781783470723
• LCCN: 2015945454
• 出版国コード: uk
• タイトル言語コード: eng
• 本文言語コード: eng
• 出版地: Cheltenham
• ページ数/冊数: viii, 412 p.
• 大きさ: 24 cm
• 分類:
  • LCC : HB846.8
  • DC23 : 302.1/3
• 件名:
  • LCSH : Social choice
  • LCSH : Voting