Macroeconomic policy, credibility and politics
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Macroeconomic policy, credibility and politics
(Harwood fundamentals of pure and applied economics / editors in chief, J. Lesourne, H. Sonnenschein, Macroeconomics ; 2)
Routledge, 2011
- : pbk
Available at 3 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Note
Reprint. Originally published: Amsterdam : Harwood Academic Publishers, 1990. (Fundamentals of pure and applied economics ; v. 38. Macroeconomic theory section)
Bibliography: p. 179-184
Includes index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Uses a game theoretic approach to explore which economic policies are 'credible' and 'politically feasible', questions that had eluded traditional macroeconomic approaches.
Table of Contents
1. Economic Policy as a Game 2. Committment versus Discretion in Monetary Policy 3. Reputation and Signalling 4. Election and Monetary Policy 5. Commitment versus Discretion in Wealth Taxation 6. Social Institutions and Credible Tax Policy 7. Credibility and Public Debt Management 8. The Political Economy of Government Debt
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