Macroeconomic policy, credibility and politics

Bibliographic Information

Macroeconomic policy, credibility and politics

Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini

(Harwood fundamentals of pure and applied economics / editors in chief, J. Lesourne, H. Sonnenschein, Macroeconomics ; 2)

Routledge, 2011

  • : pbk

Available at  / 3 libraries

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Note

Reprint. Originally published: Amsterdam : Harwood Academic Publishers, 1990. (Fundamentals of pure and applied economics ; v. 38. Macroeconomic theory section)

Bibliography: p. 179-184

Includes index

Description and Table of Contents

Description

Uses a game theoretic approach to explore which economic policies are 'credible' and 'politically feasible', questions that had eluded traditional macroeconomic approaches.

Table of Contents

1. Economic Policy as a Game 2. Committment versus Discretion in Monetary Policy 3. Reputation and Signalling 4. Election and Monetary Policy 5. Commitment versus Discretion in Wealth Taxation 6. Social Institutions and Credible Tax Policy 7. Credibility and Public Debt Management 8. The Political Economy of Government Debt

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