The economics of governance
著者
書誌事項
The economics of governance
(The international library of critical writings in economics / series editor, Mark Blaug, 328)(An Elgar research collection)
E. Elgar, c2017
大学図書館所蔵 全21件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes bibliographical references
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This collection of articles uses economic theory to explain the governance of organizations. It covers the governance of families, oligarchies, democracies, for profit firms and non-profit institutions such as religious organizations. The widespread and novel subject matter within a set of focused economic questions results in fascinating reading allowing the reader to see how similar issues can be answered in areas where the person has little knowledge of the subject. This is an engaging and useful tool for students, researchers and academics wanting to expand their area of expertise into new and exciting realms.
Contributors include: D. Acemoglu, R. Gibbons, H. Hansmann, P. Leeson, P. Rubin, B. Weingast
目次
Contents:
Introduction Donald Wittman
PART I WHO GOVERNS?
1. Henry Hansmann (1988), 'Ownership of the Firm', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, IV (2), Fall, 267-304
2. Paul H. Rubin (1978), 'The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract', Journal of Law and Economics, 21 (1),
April, 223-33
3. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986), 'The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration', Journal of Political Economy, 94 (4), August, 691-719
4. Jonathan Levin and Steven Tadelis (2005), 'Profit Sharing and the Role of Professional Partnerships', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120 (1), February, 131-71
5. Peter T. Leeson (2007), 'An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization', Journal of Political Economy, 115 (6), December, 1049-94
PART II POWER RELATIONS IN SHARED-GOVERNANCE
6. Shelly Lundberg and Robert A. Pollak (1996), 'Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 (4), Fall, 139-58
7. L.S. Shapley and Martin Shubik (1954), 'A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System', American Political Science Review, 48 (3), September, 787-92
8. David P. Baron and John A. Ferejohn (1989), 'Bargaining in Legislatures', American Political Science Review, 83 (4), December, 1181-206
9. Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Tonja Jacobi and Barry R. Weingast (2006), 'The New Separation-of-Powers Approach to American Politics', in Barry R. Weingast and Donald A.Wittman (eds), Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, Chapter 11, New York, USA: Oxford University Press, 199-222
PART III HOW DO THOSE WHO GOVERN ACTUALLY CONTROL?
10. Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen (1983), 'Separation of Ownership and Control', Journal of Law and Economics, XXVI (2), June, 301-25
11. Neil Bruce and Michael Waldman (1990), 'The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105 (1), February, 155-65
12. Donald Wittman (2005), 'The Internal Organization of the Family: Economic Analysis and Psychological Advice', Kyklos, 58 (1), February, 121-44
13. Ronald Wintrobe (1990), 'The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship', American Political Science Review, 84 (3), September, 849-72
14. Daron Acemoglu, Thierry Verdier and James A. Robinson (2004), 'Alfred Marshall Lecture: Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule', Journal of the European Economic Association, 2 (2-3), April-May, 162-92
15. Donald Wittman (2013), 'Strategic Behavior and Organizational Structure in Religions', British Journal of Political Science, 44 (4), October, 717-39
16. Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz (1984), 'Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms', American Journal of Political Science, 28 (1), February, 165-79
PART IV DEMOCRACIES VERSUS OLIGARCHIES
17. James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich (1984), 'Probabilistic Voting and the Importance of Centrist Ideologies in Democratic Elections', Journal of Politics, 46 (2), May, 459-78
18. Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1996), 'Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics', Review of Economic Studies, 63 (2), April, 265-86
19. Donald Wittman (2009), 'How Pressure Groups Activate Voters and Move Candidates Closer to the Median', Economic Journal, 119 (540), October, 1324-43
20. Mancur Olson (1993), 'Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development', American Political Science Review, 87 (3), September, 567-76
21. Daron Acemoglu (2008), 'Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies', Journal of the European Economic Association, 6 (1), March, 1-44
PART V WHY GOVERNANCE?
22. Robert Gibbons (2005), 'Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 58 (2), October, 200-245
23. Kai A. Konrad and Stergios Skaperdas (2012), 'The Market for Protection and the Origin of the State', Economic Theory, 50 (2), June, 417-43
24. Jack Hirshleifer (1995), 'Anarchy and Its Breakdown', Journal of Political Economy, 103 (1), February, 26-52
25. David Skarbek (2011), 'Governance and Prison Gangs', American Political Science Review, 105 (4), November, 702-16
Index
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