Learning in labour markets
著者
書誌事項
Learning in labour markets
(The international library of critical writings in economics / series editor, Mark Blaug, 333)(An Elgar research collection)
E. Elgar, c2017
大学図書館所蔵 全23件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes bibliographical references
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Learning in labour markets is a key feature concerning how labour markets operate. This research reviews discusses classic and important recent contributions by leading scholars concerning how firms learn about worker abilities and other worker attributes. Topics covered include; theory of symmetric learning, evidence of symmetric learning and evidence from asymmetric learning. This research review will serve as a valuable resource for scholars, libraries, and graduate students.
目次
Contents:
Introduction Michael Waldman
PART I CLASSICS
1. Michael Spence (1973), 'Job Market Signaling', 87 (3), Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, 355-74
2. Boyan Jovanovic (1979), 'Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover', Journal of Political Economy, 87 (5), Part 1, October, 972-90
3. Eugene F. Fama (1980), 'Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm', Journal of Political Economy, 88 (2), April, 288-307
4. Michael Waldman (1984), 'Job Assignments, Signaling and Efficiency', Rand Journal of Economics, 15 (2), Summer, 255-67
5. Bruce C. Greenwald (1986), 'Adverse Selection in the Labour Market', Review of Economic Studies, 53 (3), July, 325-47
6. Bengt Holmstrom (1999), 'Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective', Review of Economic Studies, 66 (1), January, 169-82
PART II EDUCATION
7. John G. Riley (1979), 'Testing the Educational Screening Hypothesis,' Journal of Political Economy, 87 (5), Part 2: Education and Income, October, S227-S252
8. Kevin Lang and David Kropp (1986), 'Human Capital Versus Sorting: The Effects of Compulsory Attendance Laws', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101 (3), August, 609-24
9. Thomas Hungerford and Gary Solon (1987), 'Sheepskin Effects in the Returns to Education', Review of Economics and Statistics, 69 (1), February, 175-7
10. Kelly Bedard (2001),'Human Capital versus Signaling Models: University Access and High School Dropouts', Journal of Political Economy, 109 (4), 749-75
11. Fabian Lange (2007), 'The Speed of Employer Learning', Journal of Labor Economics, 25 (1), 1-35
12. Peter Arcidiacono, Patrick Bayer and Aurel Hizmo (2010), 'Beyond Signaling and Human Capital: Education and the Revelation of Ability,' American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2 (4), October, 76-104
PART III THEORY OF SYMMETRIC LEARNING
13. Milton Harris and Bengt Holmstrom (1982), 'A Theory of Wage Dynamics', Review of Economic Studies, 49 (3), July, 315-33
14. Robert Gibbons and Michael Waldman (1999), 'A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (4), November, 1321-358
15. Jaime Ortega (2001), 'Job Rotation as a Learning Mechanism', Management Science, 47 (10), October, 1361-70
16. Edward P. Lazear (2004), 'The Peter Principle: A Theory of Decline', Journal of Political Economy, 112 (1) Part 2, S141-S163
PART IV EVIDENCE ON SYMMETRIC LEARNING
17. Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1992), 'Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence', Journal of Political Economy, 100 (3), June, 468-505
18. Curtis J. Simon and John T. Warner (1992), 'Matchmaker, Matchmaker: The Effect of Old Boy Networks on Job Match Quality, Earnings and Tenure', Journal of Labor Economics, 10 (3), July, 306-30
19. Henry S. Farber and Robert Gibbons (1996), 'Learning and Wage Dynamics', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111 (4), November, 1007-47
20. Joseph G. Altonji and Charles R. Pierret (2001), 'Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116 (1), February, 313-50
21. Lisa B. Kahn and Fabian Lange (2014) 'Employer Learning, Productivity, and the Earnings Distribution: Evidence from Performance Measures', Review of Economic Studies, 81, 1575-613
22. Amanda Pallais (2014), 'Inefficient Hiring in Entry-Level Labor Markets', American Economic Review, 104 (11), 3565-99
23. Jeanine Miklos-Thal and Hannes Ullrich (2016), 'Career Prospects and Effort Incentives: Evidence from Professional Soccer', Management Science, 62 (6), 1645-67
PART V THEORY OF ASYMMETRIC LEARNING
24. Paul Milgrom and Sharon Oster (1987), 'Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis', Quarterly Journal of Economics, CII (3), August, 453-76
25. James D. Montgomery (1991), 'Social Networks and Labor-Market Outcomes: Toward an Economic Analysis', American Economic Review, 81, (5), December, 1408-418
26. Dan Bernhardt (1995) 'Strategic Promotion and Compensation', Review of Economic Studies, 62 (2), April, 315-39
27. Chun Chang and Yijiang Wang (1996), 'Human Capital Investment under Asymmetric Information: The Pigovian Conjecture Revisited ', Journal of Labor Economics, 14 (3), July, 505-19
28. Jan Zabojnik and Dan Bernhardt (2001), 'Corporate Tournaments, Human Capital Acquisition, and the Firm Size-Wage Relation', Review of Economic Studies, 68 (3), 693-716
29. Hideo Owan (2004), 'Promotion, Turnover, Earnings, and Firm-Sponsored Training', Journal of Labor Economics, 22 (4), October, 955-78
PART VI EVIDENCE FROM ASYMMETRIC LEARNING
30. Robert Gibbons and Lawrence F. Katz (1991), 'Layoffs and Lemons', Journal of Labor Economics, 9 (4), October, 351-80
31. Daron Acemoglu and Jorn -Steffen Pischke (1998) 'Why do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113 (1), February, 79-119
32. Uta Schoenberg (2007), 'Testing for Asymmetric Employer Learning', Journal of Labor Economics, 25 (4), October, 651-91
33. Joshua C. Pinkston (2009), 'A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning with Testable Implications', Review of Economic Studies, 76 (1), January, 367-94
34. Jed DeVaro and Michael Waldman (2012), 'The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence', Journal of Labor Economics, 30 (1), January, 91-147
35. Lisa B. Kahn (2013), 'Asymmetric Information Between Employers', American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 5 (4), October, 165-205
Index
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