Risk, ambiguity and decision
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Bibliographic Information
Risk, ambiguity and decision
(Studies in philosophy)
Routledge, 2016
- : pbk
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Note
"First issued in paperback 2016" -- T.p. verso
Originally published: Routledge , 2001
Includes bibliographical references: p. 271-281
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Ellsberg elaborates on "Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms" and mounts a powerful challenge to the dominant theory of rational decision in this book.
Table of Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Note to Reader
- Foreword, Isaac Levi
- 1. Ambiguity and Risk
- Vagueness, Confidence, and the Weight of Arguments
- The Nature and Uses of Normative Theory
- The Validation of Normative Propositions
- The Utility Axioms as Norms
- Normative Theory and Empirical Research
- 2. The Bernoulli Proposition
- A Possible Counterexample: Are there Uncertainties that are Not Risks?
- Vulgar Evaluations of Risk
- 3. The Measurement of Definite Opinions
- von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities
- Probability as Price
- "Coherence" and "Definiteness" of Probability-Prices
- Appendix to Chapter Three
- On Making a Fool of Oneself: The Requirement of Coherence
- Acceptable Odds: Definite, Coherent, and Otherwise
- 4. Opinions and Actions: Which Come First?
- The Logic of Degrees of Belief
- Opinions that Make Horse Races
- Postulate 2: the "Sure-Thing Principle"
- Intuitive Probabilities and "Vagueness"
- Appendix to Chapter Four
- The Savage Postulates
- The Koopman Axioms
- 5. Uncertainties that are Not Risks
- The "Three-Color Urn" Example
- Vulgar Evaluations of Ambiguity
- Appendix to Chapter Five
- 6. Why Are Some Uncertainties Not Risks?
- Decision Criteria for "Complete Ignorance"
- Decision Criteria for "Partial Ignorance"
- 7. The "Restricted Hurwicz Criterion"
- The "Restricted Bayes/Hurwicz Criterion"
- Boldness and Prudence: the "n-Color Urn" Example
- Ignorance, Probability, and Varieties of Gamblers
- 8. Ambiguity and the Utility Axioms
- The Pratt/Raiffa Criticisms and the Value of Randomization
- Rubin's Axiom
- Allais and the Sure-Thing Principle
- Winning at Russian Roulette
- Bibliography
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