The atlas of reality : a comprehensive guide to metaphysics

著者

書誌事項

The atlas of reality : a comprehensive guide to metaphysics

Robert C. Koons and Timothy H. Pickavance

Wiley Blackwell, 2017

  • : hardback

大学図書館所蔵 件 / 2

この図書・雑誌をさがす

注記

Includes bibliographical references (p. [655]-669) and index

内容説明・目次

内容説明

The Atlas of Reality: A Comprehensive Guide to Metaphysics presents an extensive examination of the key topics, concepts, and guiding principles of metaphysics. Represents the most comprehensive guide to metaphysics available today Offers authoritative coverage of the full range of topics that comprise the field of metaphysics in an accessible manner while considering competing views Explores key concepts such as space, time, powers, universals, and composition with clarity and depth Articulates coherent packages of metaphysical theses that include neo-Aristotelian, Quinean, Armstrongian, and neo-Humean Carefully tracks the use of common assumptions and methodological principles in metaphysics

目次

Acknowledgements xvii Part I Foundations 1 Introduction 3 1.1 A Brief History of Metaphysics 3 1.2 Why Do Metaphysics? 5 1.3 How to Use the Book 9 2 Truthmakers 13 2.1 Introduction 13 2.2 Five Arguments for Classical Truthmaker Theory 19 2.3 The Challenge of Deflationism 25 2.4 Truthmaker Maximalism 30 2.5 Alternatives to Truthmaker Maximalism 36 2.6 Conclusion and Preview 44 Notes 45 3 Grounding, Ontological Dependence, and Fundamentality 47 3.1 Is Grounding Real? 49 3.2 Relation between Grounding and Truthmaking 55 3.3 Relation between Grounding and Ontological Dependence 58 3.4 Conceptual vs. Extra-Conceptual Grounding 62 3.5 Alternatives to Grounding? 65 3.6 Can Grounding Relations be Grounded? 69 3.7 Connections between Grounding and Entailment 71 3.8 How is Grounding Different from Causal Explanation? 72 3.9 Conclusion: Grounding and Ontological Economy 72 Notes 73 Part II Dispositions 4 Conditionals 77 4.1 Counterfactual Conditionals: Semantics, Logic, and Metaphysics 78 4.2 Hypotheticalism 84 4.3 Anti-Hypotheticalism and Laws of Nature 86 4.4 Strong Hypotheticalism: Counterfactual Accounts of Powers and Dispositions 90 Notes 92 5 Laws of Nature 94 5.1 Strong Nomism: The Dretske-Armstrong-Tooley (DAT) Theory of Laws 94 5.2 Neo-Humeism: Reduction of Conditionals, Laws, and Powers 99 Notes 105 6 Powers and Properties 106 6.1 Advantages of Strong Powerism 106 6.2 The Individuation of Properties 108 6.3 Objections to Strong Powerism 118 6.4 Conclusion 121 Notes 121 Part III Universals and Particulars 7 Universals 125 7.1 Introduction 125 7.1.1 What properties must explain 126 7.2 Realism 128 7.3 Universals and the Problem of Intentionality 142 7.4 Properties as the Ground of Causal Powers 145 Notes 145 8 Reductive Nominalism and Trope Theory 147 8.1 Reductive Nominalism 147 8.2 Trope Theory 165 8.3 Conclusion 169 Notes 169 9 Particulars and the Problem of Individuation 171 9.1 Introduction 171 9.2 Facts 172 9.3 Substances 175 Notes 200 10 Relations, Structures, and Quantities 201 10.1 Accounts of Relational Facts 201 10.2 Non-Symmetrical Relations and the Problem of Order 206 10.3 Structural Universals and Constituent Ontology 215 10.4 Determinables, Quantities, and Real Numbers 219 10.5 Conclusion and Preview 225 Notes 225 Part IV The Nature of Reality 11 Nihilism and Monism 229 11.1 Nihilism and Aliquidism 229 11.2 Monism 237 Note 252 12 The Non-Existent and the Vaguely Existing 253 12.1 Does Everything Exist? 253 12.2 Ontic Vagueness 271 12.3 Conclusion 280 13 Solipsism, Idealism, and the Problem of Perception 281 13.1 Defining the Mental and the External 282 13.2 Solipsism and Phenomenalism 284 13.3 Theories of Perception 286 13.4 Arguments against Phenomenalism 306 13.5 Arguments against Solipsism 309 13.6 Conclusion and Preview 312 Notes 313 Part V Modality 14 Possibility, Necessity, and Actuality: Concretism 317 14.1 Introduction 317 14.2 Concretism:Worlds as Universes 321 14.3 Problems for Concretism 327 14.4 Conclusion 331 Note 331 15 Abstractionism:Worlds as Representations 332 15.1 Magical Abstractionism 333 15.2 Structural Abstractionism 341 15.3 Aristotelian Theories of Possibility 348 15.4 Conclusion 350 Note 351 16 De Re Modality and Modal Knowledge 352 16.1 Modality De Re: Transworld Identity and Counterpart Theory 352 16.2 Modality and Epistemology: Possibility and Conceivability 363 16.3 Conclusion 369 Notes 369 Part VI Space and Time 17 Is Space Merely Relational? 373 17.1 The Nature of Location 373 17.2 Spatial Substantivalism 375 17.3 Spatial Relationism 381 17.4 Absences and Vacuums 386 17.5 Conclusion 388 Notes 389 18 Structure of Space: Points vs. Regions 390 18.1 Constructing Points from Regions 391 18.2 Points vs. Regions 394 18.3 Arguments against Points as Fundamental 397 18.4 Voluminism vs. Volume-Boundary Dualism 408 18.5 Conclusion 414 Note 414 19 The Structure of Time 415 19.1 Is Time Composed of Instants or Intervals? 415 19.2 Instants as Dependent Entities 425 19.3 Does Time have a Beginning? 427 19.4 Conclusion 429 20 Time's Passage 430 20.1 Tensers and Anti-Tensers 432 20.2 Varieties of Anti-Tensism 435 20.3 Varieties of Tensism 437 20.4 Presentism 439 20.5 Arguments for Tensism 442 20.6 Conclusion 456 Note 457 21 Arguments for Anti-Tensism 458 21.1 How Fast Does Time Flow? 458 21.2 Truthmakers for Truths about the Past 461 21.3 The Theory of Relativity 469 21.4 Epistemological Problems for Tensism 473 21.5 McTaggart's Paradox 474 21.6 Brute Necessities of Time 476 21.7 Conclusion 478 Part VII Unity 22 Material Composition: The Special Question 481 22.1 The Existence of Composite Things 482 22.2 Are Composite Things an "Ontological Free Lunch"? 482 22.3 Redundancy 485 22.4 Fundamental Heaps 490 22.5 Fundamental Artifacts 497 22.6 Living Organisms vs. Mereological Nihilism 499 22.7 Finding an Intelligible Principle of Composition 504 Notes 513 23 Composition: The General Question 514 23.1 Formal Mereology: Lesniewski, Goodman, and Leonard 514 23.2 Three (or Four) Answers to the General Composition Question 518 23.3 Accounting for the Correct Principles of Mereology 523 23.4 Parthood and Truthmaking 529 Notes 530 24 Change and Persistence 531 24.1 Does Anything Change? Does Anything Persist? 532 24.2 How Objects Change Properties: Substratism vs. Replacementism 537 24.3 The Metaphysics of Motion 551 Notes 554 25 The Persistence of Composite Things 555 25.1 Mereological Constancy and Inconstancy 556 25.2 Coincident Things 564 25.3 Conclusion 573 Note 574 Part VIII Causation 26 The Existence and Scope of Causation 577 26.1 Are there Causes? 577 26.2 The Scope of Causation 583 Note 589 27 Causation: A Relation between Things or Truths? 591 27.1 Causal Explanationism 592 27.2 Causal Connectionism 605 Notes 611 28 Discrete and Continuous Causation 613 28.1 Is All Causation Discrete? 614 28.2 The Nature of Discrete Causation 614 28.3 Is All Causation Continuous? 616 28.4 The Nature of Continuous Processes 618 28.5 Processes and the Direction of Continuous Causation 621 28.6 Are Processes an Exception to Hume's Epistemic Principle? 622 28.7 Conclusion: The Consequences of Causation 623 Notes 623 29 Conclusion: The Four Packages 624 Appendix A 633 Appendix B 651 References 655 Index 671

「Nielsen BookData」 より

詳細情報

  • NII書誌ID(NCID)
    BB25109452
  • ISBN
    • 9781119116127
  • 出版国コード
    uk
  • タイトル言語コード
    eng
  • 本文言語コード
    eng
  • 出版地
    Chichester, U.K.
  • ページ数/冊数
    xv, 699 p.
  • 大きさ
    26 cm
  • 分類
  • 件名
ページトップへ