Game theory in management accounting : implementing incentives and fairness
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Game theory in management accounting : implementing incentives and fairness
(Contributions to management science)
Springer, c2018
- : [softcover]
Available at 10 libraries
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Note
Includes bibliographical references and indexes
"Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2017" -- T.p. verso
Description and Table of Contents
Description
This book demonstrates what kind of problems, originating in a management accounting setting, may be solved with game theoretic models. Game theory has experienced growing interest and numerous applications in the field of management accounting. The main focus traditionally has been on the field of non-cooperative behaviour, but the area of cooperative game theory has developed rapidly and has received increasing attention. Intensive research, in combination with the changing culture of publishing, has produced a nearly unmanageable number of publications in the areas concerned. Therefore, one main purpose of this volume is providing an intensive analysis of the intersection of these areas. In addition, the book strengthens the relationship between the theory and the practical applications and it illustrates the two-sided relationship between game theory and management accounting: new game theoretic models offer new fields of applications and these applications raise new questions for the theory.
Table of Contents
Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Non-cooperativeModels: Designing Incentives
1 Jennifer Kunz:
Reflections on the Practical Applicability of Strategic Game Theory
to Managerial Incentivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 Christian Lukas:
Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts: Behavioural and
Multi-Period PerformanceMeasurement Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3 ClemensLoeffler:
Transfer Prices for Coordination under Decentralized Decision
Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 Hans-Ulrich Kupper, Kai Sandner:
Differences in Social Preferences: Are They Profitable for the Firm?
5 Gunter Bamberg, Michael Krapp:
Managerial Compensa
tion, Investment Decisions, and Truthfully
Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Non-cooperativeModels: Revealing the True Preferences
6 Max Patzenhauer:
Applications and Potentials of Auction Theory in Management
Accounting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7 Benno Woskowski:
The Use of Auction in Nurse Rostering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CooperativeModels: Analysing the Notion of Fairness
8 Stephan Zelewski:
Fair Distribution of Cooperation Gains in Supply Chains - A
Justification Program from an Economic Point of View . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9 Holger I. Meinhardt
The Pre-Kernel as a Fair Division Rule for some Cooperative Game
Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10 Juan D. Moreno-Ternero:
A Talmudic Approach to Bankruptcy Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Preface xiii
11 Jens Leth Hougaard:
Sharing the Costs of Access to a Set of Public Goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12 Javier Arin, Ilya Katsev:
The SD-prenucleolus for TU-Games: Coalitional Monotonicity and
Core Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cooperative Models: Applications and Specifications
13 Jose M. Gallardo, Nieves Jimenez, Andres Jimenez-Losada:
A Shapley Value for Games with Authorization Structure . . . . . . . . . . .
14 Gerhard Aust, Dora Dominko, Udo Buscher:
Interorganizational Resource Sharing in Research and
Development Alliances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15 Al
ejandro Saavedra-Nieves, Ignacio Garcia-Jurado, M. Gloria
Fiestras-Janeiro:
Placing Joint Orders when Holding Costs are Negligible and
Shortages are not Allowed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
16 Ana Meca, J. Carlos Varela-Pena:
Corporation Tax Games: An Application of Linear Cost Games to
Managerial Cost Accounting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
17 Stephan Zelewski, Tatjana Heeb:
Characteristics of the -value and the -value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
18 David Mueller:
The Usability and Validity of Allocation Schemes for Corporate
Cost Accounting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Contributing Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
List of Journal Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
by "Nielsen BookData"