Handbook of game theory and industrial organization

著者

書誌事項

Handbook of game theory and industrial organization

edited by Luis C. Corchón, Marco A. Marini

Edward Elgar, c2018

  • : set
  • v. 1. Theory
  • v. 2. Applications

大学図書館所蔵 件 / 全24件

この図書・雑誌をさがす

注記

Includes bibliographical references and index

内容説明・目次

巻冊次

v. 1. Theory ISBN 9781785363276

内容説明

Industrial organization studies how markets allocate resources, specifically when there are few agents or when there are frictions that render the price-taking paradigm unsuitable. Game theory explores situations in which agents interact strategically and provides a useful foundation for studying many traditional industrial organization topics. The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main tools of game theory that are used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, and learning and information sharing models. Technical yet accessible, this comprehensive resource will be required reading for both established researchers as well as graduate or advanced undergraduate students in industrial economics and game theory. Contributors incude: R. Amir, A. Attar, G.I. Bischi, F. Bloch, L. Corchon, S. Currarini, C. d'Aspremont, F. Feri, J. Gabszewicz, M. Jensen, L. Julien, F. Lamantia, I. Macho-Stadler, M. Marini, E. Maskin, D. Perez-Castrillo, C. Pimienta, D. Radi, R.A. Ritz, K. Ritzberger, O. Tarola, J. Thisse, A. Urbano, P. Ushchev, X. Vives, J. Zhao

目次

Contents: Foreword by Eric Maskin 1. Introduction Luis C. Corchon and Marco A. Marini PART I BASIC GAMES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2. Strategic complementarities in oligopoly Xavier Vives 3. On the Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies and the theory of supermodular games Rabah Amir 4. Aggregative games Martin Kaae Jensen 5. Monopolistic competition without apology Jacques-Francois Thisse and Philip Ushchev 6. Oligopoly and product differentiation Jean J. Gabszewicz and Ornella Tarola 7. Oligopolistic competition and welfare Robert A. Ritz PART II DYNAMIC GAMES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 8. Dynamic games Klaus Ritzberger 9. Strategic refinements Carlos Pimienta 10. Stackelberg games Ludovic A. Julien 11. Entry games and free entry equilibria Michele Polo 12. Evolutionary oligopoly games with heterogeneous adaptive players Gian Italo Bischi, Fabio Lamantia and Davide Radi PART III GAMES OF COLLUSION IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 13. Coalitions and networks in oligopolies Francis Bloch 14. TU oligopoly games and industrial cooperation Jingang Zhao PART IV INFORMATION GAMES 15. Trading under asymmetric information: positive and normative implications Andrea Attar and Claude d'Aspremont 16. Moral hazard: Base models and two extensions Ines Macho-Stadler and David Pe rez-Castrillo 17. Learning in markets Amparo Urbano 18. Information sharing in oligopoly Sergio Currarini and Francesco Feri Index
巻冊次

v. 2. Applications ISBN 9781788112772

内容説明

Game theory explores situations in which agents interact strategically and provides a useful foundation for studying many traditional industrial organization topics. This approach has also enabled the emergence of new areas of enquiry including law and economics, networks, the digital economy, auctions, experimental game theory and many others. This second volume of the Handbook includes original contributions by experts in the field. It provides up-to-date surveys of the most relevant applications of game theory to industrial organization. The book covers both classical and industrial organization topics such as mergers in markets with homogeneous and differentiated goods, leniency and coordinated effects in cartels and mergers, static and dynamic contests, consumer search and product safety, strategic delegation, platforms and network effects, auctions, environmental and resource economics, intellectual property, healthcare, corruption, experimental industrial organization, and empirical models of research and development. Authoritative and engaging, this unique Handbook will be an indispensable resource for all serious academics, researchers and students of industrial economics and game theory. Contributors incude: S. Anderson, A. Barge-Gil, P. Belleflamme, J. Brandts, R. Burguet, L. Corchon, A. Daughety, N. Fabra, R. Fauli-Oller, J.-J. Ganuza, M.l. Gonzalez Maestre, A. Hernando-Veciana, M. Hoffmann, E. Huergo, M. Kopel, L. Lambertini, A. Lopez, M. Marini, C. Marvao, E. Maskin, J.G. Montalvo, L. Moreno, M. Motta, P. Olivella, M. Peitz, M. Pezzino, M. Polo, J. Potters, J. Reinganum, R. Renault, G. Rota Preziosi, J. Sandonis, M. Serena, G. Spagnolo

目次

Contents: Foreword by Eric Maskin 1. Introduction Luis C. Corchon and Marco A. Marini PART I COLLUSION AND MERGERS 2. Horizontal mergers in oligopoly Ramon Fauli -Oller and Joel Sandonis 3. Collusive agreements in vertically differentiated markets Marco A. Marini 4. Cartels and leniency: Taking stock of what we learnt Catarina Marvao and Giancarlo Spagnolo 5. Assessing coordinated effects in merger cases Natalia Fabra and Massimo Motta PART II CONTESTS 6. Contest theory Luis C. Corcho n and Marco Serena 7. Endogenous timing in contests Magnus Hoffmann and Gre goire Rota-Graziosi PART III SPECIAL TOPICS 8. Firm pricing with consumer search Simon P. Anderson and Regis Renault 9. Market structure, liability, and product safety Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum 10. Strategic delegation in oligopoly Michael Kopel and Mario Pezzino 11. Platforms and network effects Paul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz 12. Auctions Angel Hernando-Veciana 13. Differential oligopoly games in environmental and resource economics Luca Lambertini 14. Intellectual property Miguel Gonza lez-Maestre 15. Healthcare and health insurance markets Pau Olivella 16. The microeconomics of corruption Roberto Burguet, Juan-Jose Ganuza and Jose G. Montalvo PART IV EXPERIMENTAL AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 17. Experimental industrial organization Jordi Brandts and Jan Potters 18. Empirical models of firms' R&D Andres Barge-Gil, Elena Huergo, Alberto Lo pez and Lourdes Moreno Index

「Nielsen BookData」 より

詳細情報

ページトップへ