The third Wittgenstein : the post-Investigations works
著者
書誌事項
The third Wittgenstein : the post-Investigations works
(Ashgate Wittgensteinian studies)
Routledge, 2016, c2004
- : pbk
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注記
"First published 2004 by Ashgate Publishing"--T.p. verso
"First issued in paperback 2016"--T.p. verso
Includes bibliographical references (p. 211-218) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This anthology establishes the existence of a distinct and important post-Investigations Wittgenstein, uncovering the overlooked treasures of the final corpus and crystallising key perceptions of what his last thought was achieving. Speaking of a 'third Wittgenstein', this book seeks to correct the traditional bipartite conception of Wittgenstein's thought into his Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations by focusing on his neglected last masterpiece, On Certainty, and works contemporaneous with it: Remarks on Colour, Last Writings in the Philosophy of Psychology, and Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. A Leading international Wittgenstein scholars reveal why On Certainty should be recognised as one of Wittgenstein's three great works. This sustained examination shows that the third Wittgenstein breaks new ground with insights unprecedented in both his own work and philosophy more broadly, giving us keys to the solution and dissolution of problems that have plagued philosophy since Descartes, such as philosophical scepticism and the mind-body problem. Wittgenstein's ultimate and revised positions with regard to epistemology, foundationalism, 'grammar', naturalism, the psychology of language, and psychological indeterminacy are clearly delineated. This book also provides new and illuminating accounts of difficult concepts, such as patterns of life, experiencing meaning, meaning blindness, lying and pretence.
目次
- Contents: Introduction: the idea of a third Wittgenstein, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock
- Wittgenstein's foundational metaphors, Avrum Stroll
- Two Wittgensteins too many: Wittgenstein's foundationalism, Dan Hutto
- On Certainty and the grammaticalization of experience, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock
- Knowledge, certainty and scepticism: in Moore's defence, Hans-Johann Glock
- Wittgenstein's social naturalism: the idea of 'second nature' after the Philosophical Investigations, Jose Medina
- Wittgenstein and epistemology, John Koethe
- What does 'experiencing meaning' mean?, Laurence Goldstein
- 'Patterns of life': a third Wittgenstein concept, Michel ter Hark
- Pretence and the inner, John V. Canfield
- Wittgenstein on lying as a language game, Dale Jacquette
- Wittgenstein's answer to 'what is colour?', Jacques Bouveresse
- Wittgenstein and the riddle of life, Frank Cioffi
- Bibliography
- Index.
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