Spending to win : political institutions, economic geography, and government subsidies
著者
書誌事項
Spending to win : political institutions, economic geography, and government subsidies
(Political economy of institutions and decisions)
Cambridge University Press, 2018
- : hardback
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. 216-235) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Governments in some democracies target economic policies, like industrial subsidies, to small groups at the expense of many. Why do some governments redistribute more narrowly than others? Their willingness to selectively target economic benefits, like subsidies to businesses, depends on the way politicians are elected and the geographic distribution of economic activities. Based on interviews with government ministers and bureaucrats, as well as parliamentary records, industry publications, local media coverage, and new quantitative data, Spending to Win: Political Institutions, Economic Geography, and Government Subsidies demonstrates that government policy-making can be explained by the combination of electoral institutions and economic geography. Specifically, it shows how institutions interact with economic geography to influence countries' economic policies and international economic relations. Identical institutions have wide-ranging effects depending on the context in which they operate. No single institution is a panacea for issues, such as income inequality, international economic conflict, or minority representation.
目次
- Tables
- Figures
- Acknowledgements
- 1. Who gets what and why? The politics of particularistic economic policies
- 2. The uneven geographic dispersion of economic activity
- 3. How institutions and geography work together to shape policy
- 4. Explaining government spending on industrial subsidies
- 5. The power of producers: successful demands for state aid
- 6. Why institutional differences among proportional representation systems matter
- 7. The policy effects of electoral competitiveness in closed-list PR
- 8. Conclusion and implications
- References
- Index.
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