Commonsense pluralism about truth : an empirical defence
著者
書誌事項
Commonsense pluralism about truth : an empirical defence
（Palgrave pivot）
Palgrave Macmillan, c2017
大学図書館所蔵 件 / 全2件
-
該当する所蔵館はありません
- すべての絞り込み条件を解除する
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Truth is a pervasive feature of ordinary language, deserving of systematic study, and few theorists of truth have endeavoured to chronicle the tousled conceptual terrain forming the non-philosopher's ordinary view. In this book, the author recasts the philosophical treatment of truth in light of historical and recent work in experimental philosophy. He argues that the commonsense view of truth is deeply fragmented along two axes, across different linguistic discourses and among different demographics, termed in the book as endoxic alethic pluralism. To defend this view, four conclusions must be reached: (1) endoxic alethic pluralism should be compatible with how the everyday person uses truth, (2) the common conception of truth should be derivable from empirical data, (3) this descriptive metaphysical project is one aspect of a normative theory of truth, and (4) endoxic alethic pluralism is at least partially immune to challenges facing the ecological method in experimental philosophy and alethic pluralism.
目次
Chapter 1: Introduction.- Chapter 2: On the "Common Conception" of Truth.- Chapter 3: A Defence of Descriptive Metaphysics.- Chapter 4: An Ecological Approach in Experimental Philosophy.- Chapter 5: Commonsense Pluralism about Truth (Endoxic Alethic Pluralism). Chapter 6: Challenging Endoxic Alethic Pluralism.
「Nielsen BookData」 より