Voting procedures for electing a single candidate : proving their (in)vulnerability to various voting paradoxes
著者
書誌事項
Voting procedures for electing a single candidate : proving their (in)vulnerability to various voting paradoxes
（Springer briefs in economics）
Springer, c2018
大学図書館所蔵 全1件
注記
Includes bibliographical references
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This book deals with 18 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid paradoxical outcomes. Together with a companion volume by the same authors, Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, published by Springer in 2017, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes.
目次
Introduction.- Voting Paradoxes.- Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate.- The (In)Vulnerability of Non-Ranked Voting Procedures to Various Paradoxes.- The (In)Vulnerability of Ranked Voting Procedures that are Not Condorcet-Consistent to Various Paradoxes.- The (In)Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet-Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes.- Summary.
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