Eisenhower's nuclear calculus in Europe : the politics of IRBM deployment in NATO nations
著者
書誌事項
Eisenhower's nuclear calculus in Europe : the politics of IRBM deployment in NATO nations
McFarland, c2018
大学図書館所蔵 全1件
注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. 184-194) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Through a reliance on nuclear weapons, President Eisenhower hoped to provide a defense strategy that would allow the U.S. to maintain its security requirements without creating an economic burden. This defense strategy, known as the New Look, benefited the U.S. Air Force with its focus on strategic nuclear weapons. The U.S. also required European missile bases to deploy their intermediate range ballistic missiles, while efforts continued to develop U.S.- based intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Deploying such missiles to Europe required balancing regional European concerns with U.S. domestic security priorities. In the wake of the Soviet Sputnik launch in 1957, the U.S. began to fear Soviet missile capabilities. Using European missile bases would mitigate this domestic security issue, but convincing NATO allies to base the missiles in their countries raised issues of sovereignty and weapons control and ran the risk of creating divisions in the NATO alliance.
目次
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction
1. Creating the New Look: Project Solarium and the Intellectual Foundation of the New Look Defense Policy
2. Many Strands into One Rope: Creating a Unified Defense Policy
3. Resistance to Massive Retaliation: The Arguments Against Massive Retaliation and the Deficiencies in Eisenhower’s National Security Policies
4. The Development of IRBMs
5. The Suez Crisis and Bermuda Conference Reconciliation
6. A European Solution to an American Problem: Eisenhower’s Initial Reaction to the Soviet Launch of Sputnik
7. U.S-U.K. IRBM Agreement
8. Unintended Consequences
Conclusion
Chapter Notes
Bibliography
Index
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