Games in management science : essays in honor of Georges Zaccour
著者
書誌事項
Games in management science : essays in honor of Georges Zaccour
（International series in operations research & management science, v. 280）
Springer, c2020
大学図書館所蔵 全6件
注記
"Contributions by Georges Zaccour": p. xiii-xxv
Includes bibliographical references
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This book covers a large spectrum of cutting-edge game theory applications in management science in which Professor Georges Zaccour has made significant contributions. The book consists of 21 chapters and highlights the latest treatments of game theory in various areas, including marketing, supply chains, energy and environmental management, and cyber defense. With this book, former Ph.D. students and successful research collaborators of Professor Zaccour wish to honor his many scientific achievements.
目次
Chapter 1. A Lanchester-Type Dynamic Game of Advertising and Pricing.- Chapter 2. On the Modelling of Price Effects in the Diffusion of Optional Contingent Products.- Chapter 3. The effects of consumer rebates in a competitive distribution channel.- Chapter 4. On the coordination of static and dynamic marketing channels in a duopoly with advertising.- Chapter 5. Product Recalls and Channel Pricing.- Chapter 6. Coordination in Closed-loop supply chain with price-dependent returns.- Chapter 7. A steady-state game of a net-zero emission climate regime.- Chapter 8. Dynamic Models of the Firm with Green Energy and Goodwill with a Constant Size of the Output Market.- Chapter 9. A Review of Experiments on Dynamic Games in Environmental and Resource Economics.- Chapter 10. Managerial incentives and polluting inputs under imperfect competition.- Chapter 11. Non-linear incentive equilibrium strategies for a transboundary pollution differential game.- Chapter 12. Strategic interaction among firms in output and emission markets: a unified framework.- Chapter 13. Human vs River: Cooperation in Environmental Games through Environmental Personhood.- Chapter 14. A dynamic game with interaction between Kantian players and Nashian players.- Chapter 15. Frugals, Militants and the Oil Market.- Chapter 16. Compliance with social norms as an evolutionary stable equilibrium.- Chapter 17. Building E cient Institutions: A Two-Stage Differential Game.- Chapter 18. Game theory and cyber defence.- Chapter 19. A LQ vaccine communication game.- Chapter 20. On the Stability of a Two-Player International Environmental Agreement with Intra-Industry Trade.- Chapter 21. Stable coalition structures in dynamic competitive environment.
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