Reasons in action : a reductionist account of intentional action
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Reasons in action : a reductionist account of intentional action
Oxford University Press, 2019
- : hardback
Available at / 3 libraries
-
No Libraries matched.
- Remove all filters.
Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. [165]-167) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Ingmar Persson offers an original view of the processes of human action: deliberating on the basis of reasons for and against actions, making a decision about what to do, and from there implementing the decision in action in a way that makes the action intentional. Persson's analysis is mainly developed to suit physical actions, though how it needs to be modified to cover mental acts is also discussed. The interpretation of intentional action that is presented is
reductionist in the sense that it does not appeal to any concepts that are distinctive of the domain of action theory, such as a unique type of agent-causation, or irreducible mental acts, like acts of will, volitions, decisions, or tryings. Nor does it appeal to any unanalyzed attitudes or states
essentially related to intentional action, like intentions and desires to act. Instead, the intentionality of actions is construed as springing from desires conceived as physical states of agents which cause facts because of the way agents think of them. A sense of our having responsibility that is sufficient for our acting for reasons is also sketched out.
Table of Contents
Introduction
1: Acting and Thinking
2: The Purport of Reason-Conditionals
3: The Reference to Desire in Reasons for Action
4: Reasoning about Means
5: The Intentionality of Actions: Basic and Non-Basic
6: Refraining: Its Nature and Normative Role
Conclusion
by "Nielsen BookData"