Mass tort deals : backroom bargaining in multidistrict litigation
著者
書誌事項
Mass tort deals : backroom bargaining in multidistrict litigation
Cambridge University Press, 2019
- : pbk
大学図書館所蔵 件 / 全1件
-
該当する所蔵館はありません
- すべての絞り込み条件を解除する
注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Mass-tort lawsuits over products like pelvic and hernia mesh, Roundup, opioids, talcum powder, and hip implants consume a substantial part of the federal civil caseload. But multidistrict litigation, which federal courts use to package these individual tort suits into one proceeding, has not been extensively analyzed. In Mass Tort Deals, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch marshals a wide array of empirical data to suggest that a systematic lack of checks and balances in our courts may benefit everyone but the plaintiffs - the very people who are often unable to stand up for themselves. Rather than faithfully representing them, plaintiffs' lawyers may sell them out in backroom settlements that compensate lawyers handsomely, pay plaintiffs little, and deny them the justice they seek. From diagnosis to reforms, Burch's goal isn't to eliminate these suits; it's to save them. This book is a must read for concerned citizens, policymakers, lawyers, and judges alike.
目次
- Introduction
- 1. When mass torts meet multidistrict litigation
- 2. Quid-pro-quo arrangements?
- 3. The rise of repeat players
- 4. Judges as bulwarks and nudgers
- 5. When MDL settles into 'ADR'
- 6. Reforming multidistrict litigation
- Conclusion.
「Nielsen BookData」 より