Nuclear weapons and deterrence stability in South Asia
著者
書誌事項
Nuclear weapons and deterrence stability in South Asia
(Palgrave pivot)
Palgrave Macmillan, c2020
- : hbk
大学図書館所蔵 全2件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This book examines the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan, two highly antagonistic South Asian neighbors who recently moved into their third decade of overt nuclear weaponization. It assesses the stability of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence and argues that, while deterrence dampens the likelihood of escalation to conventional-and possibly nuclear-war, the chronically embittered relations between New Delhi and Islamabad mean that deterrence failure resulting in major warfare cannot be ruled out. Through an empirical examination of the effects of nuclear weapons during five crises between India and Pakistan since 1998, as well as a discussion of the theoretical logic of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence, the book offers suggestions for enhancing deterrence stability between these two countries.
目次
Chapter 1 Introduction
The India-Pakistan Nuclear Arms Competition in 2019The Political ContextMain Arguments and Chapter Plan
Chapter 2 India-Pakistan Crises, 1999-2016The Kargil ConflictThe "Twin Peaks" CrisisThe 26/11 Mumbai Terrorist AttacksThe Uri Attack and Indian "Surgical Strikes"
Chapter 3 Explaining Indian Moderation During Crises, 1999-2016Nuclear DeterrenceU.S. Crisis ManagementPoor Conventional Military OptionsStrategic RestraintConclusion
Chapter 4 Deterrence Stability in South Asia TodayThe Concept of Deterrence StabilityIndia-Pakistan Relations after the February 2019 CrisisIndian and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons: Capabilities, Doctrine, Command and ControlThe Nature of "Ugly Stability" between India and PakistanThe Theoretical Logic of South Asian Nuclear DeterrenceConclusion: Deterrence Stability in South Asia?
Chapter 5 Enhancing India-Pakistan Deterrence StabilityTrendsMeasures to Enhance Deterrence StabilityThe U.S. Role
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