Nuclear weapons and deterrence stability in South Asia
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Nuclear weapons and deterrence stability in South Asia
(Palgrave pivot)
Palgrave Macmillan, c2020
- : hbk
Available at 2 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Description and Table of Contents
Description
This book examines the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan, two highly antagonistic South Asian neighbors who recently moved into their third decade of overt nuclear weaponization. It assesses the stability of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence and argues that, while deterrence dampens the likelihood of escalation to conventional-and possibly nuclear-war, the chronically embittered relations between New Delhi and Islamabad mean that deterrence failure resulting in major warfare cannot be ruled out. Through an empirical examination of the effects of nuclear weapons during five crises between India and Pakistan since 1998, as well as a discussion of the theoretical logic of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence, the book offers suggestions for enhancing deterrence stability between these two countries.
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction
The India-Pakistan Nuclear Arms Competition in 2019The Political ContextMain Arguments and Chapter Plan
Chapter 2 India-Pakistan Crises, 1999-2016The Kargil ConflictThe "Twin Peaks" CrisisThe 26/11 Mumbai Terrorist AttacksThe Uri Attack and Indian "Surgical Strikes"
Chapter 3 Explaining Indian Moderation During Crises, 1999-2016Nuclear DeterrenceU.S. Crisis ManagementPoor Conventional Military OptionsStrategic RestraintConclusion
Chapter 4 Deterrence Stability in South Asia TodayThe Concept of Deterrence StabilityIndia-Pakistan Relations after the February 2019 CrisisIndian and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons: Capabilities, Doctrine, Command and ControlThe Nature of "Ugly Stability" between India and PakistanThe Theoretical Logic of South Asian Nuclear DeterrenceConclusion: Deterrence Stability in South Asia?
Chapter 5 Enhancing India-Pakistan Deterrence StabilityTrendsMeasures to Enhance Deterrence StabilityThe U.S. Role
by "Nielsen BookData"