Shareholder-driven corporate governance
著者
書誌事項
Shareholder-driven corporate governance
Oxford University Press, c2020
大学図書館所蔵 件 / 全6件
-
該当する所蔵館はありません
- すべての絞り込み条件を解除する
注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
How effectively can governing mechanisms forged before the surge of activist investment continue to protect shareholders and efficiently order capital markets? This is a pressing question for scholars and practitioners of corporate law, as well as for market participants generally. In order to illuminate the extent to which the growing trend of shareholder activism calls for a new understanding of the kind of shareholder-corporate relations the law should facilitate,
this book introduces the concept of shareholder-driven corporate governance. This concept refers to the evident phenomenon of shareholder involvement in corporate governance and offers a normative endorsement of this development.
In order to secure the benefits of investors' increasing involvement in corporate affairs, regulatory regimes must grapple with a number of considerations. This book is based on the idea that shareholder corporate governance is a welcome development, but that it does not come without regulatory challenges. For one, it requires rejecting the idea that well-ordered capital markets can be achieved through corporate law which is subservient to private ordering. The mandatory character of, for
example, securities regulation is vital to fostering shareholder involvement in corporate affairs. Defenders of shareholder corporate governance must also confront the matter of "wolf packs," or loosely formed bands of investors who defy existing regulatory categories but nonetheless exert collective
influence. Regulation that is sensitive to both the inadequacies of past approaches to corporate-shareholder relations and the novel challenges posed by increasing shareholder activism will be able to harness activism, allowing capital markets to flourish.
目次
Preface
Chapter 1: What is "Shareholder-driven Corporate Governance"?
Chapter 2: SCG and Corporate Law Theory
Chapter 3: Shareholder Democracy and Shareholder Activism
Chapter 4: Activism, Wolf Packs and SCG
Chapter 5: Multiple Voting Share Structures
Chapter 6: Shareholders and Takeover Bids: Revisiting the Poison Pill
Chapter 7: Policy Choices
List of Acronyms
References
「Nielsen BookData」 より