Learning and coordination : inductive deliberation, equilibrium, and convention
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Learning and coordination : inductive deliberation, equilibrium, and convention
（Studies in ethics）（A Routledge series）
Routledge, 2016, c2001
- : pbk
Available at 1 libraries
Note
"First issued in paperback 2016"
Includes bibliographical references (p. 213-218 ) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Vanderschraaf develops a new theory of game theory equilibrium selection in this book. The new theory defends general correlated equilibrium concepts and suggests a new analysis of convention.
Table of Contents
- 1. Social Interactions and Principles of Rational Decision
- 1.0 Introduction
- 1.1 Examples of Social Coordination Problems
- 1.2 Noncooperative Games
- 1.3 Nash Equilibrium
- 1.4 Examples Revisited
- 1.5 Equilibrium-in-Beliefs
- 1.6 Conclusions
- 2. Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibrium Concepts
- 2.0 Introduction
- 2.1 Rationalizability
- 2.3 Correlated Equilibrium Concepts
- 3. Equilibrium Selection via Inductive Dynamic Deliberation
- 3.0 Introduction
- 3.1 The Dirichlet Rule
- 3.2 Inductive Deliberation with Endogenous Correlation
- 3.3 Correlating With Stages of the World
- 3.4 Dirichlet Dynamics With Imperfect Memory
- 3.5 Random Sampling Dirichlet Deliberation
- 3.6 Deliberators With Variable States
- 4. The Emergence of Social Convention
- 4.0 Introduction
- 4.1 Lewis' Characterization of Conventions
- 4.2 Convention as Correlated Equilibrium
- 4.3 Dynamical Explanations of Conventions
- References
- Index
by "Nielsen BookData"