Learning and coordination : inductive deliberation, equilibrium, and convention

Author(s)

    • Vanderschraaf, Peter

Bibliographic Information

Learning and coordination : inductive deliberation, equilibrium, and convention

Peter Vanderschraaf

(Studies in ethics)(A Routledge series)

Routledge, 2016, c2001

  • : pbk

Available at  / 1 libraries

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Note

"First issued in paperback 2016"

Includes bibliographical references (p. 213-218 ) and index

Description and Table of Contents

Description

Vanderschraaf develops a new theory of game theory equilibrium selection in this book. The new theory defends general correlated equilibrium concepts and suggests a new analysis of convention.

Table of Contents

  • 1. Social Interactions and Principles of Rational Decision
  • 1.0 Introduction
  • 1.1 Examples of Social Coordination Problems
  • 1.2 Noncooperative Games
  • 1.3 Nash Equilibrium
  • 1.4 Examples Revisited
  • 1.5 Equilibrium-in-Beliefs
  • 1.6 Conclusions
  • 2. Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibrium Concepts
  • 2.0 Introduction
  • 2.1 Rationalizability
  • 2.3 Correlated Equilibrium Concepts
  • 3. Equilibrium Selection via Inductive Dynamic Deliberation
  • 3.0 Introduction
  • 3.1 The Dirichlet Rule
  • 3.2 Inductive Deliberation with Endogenous Correlation
  • 3.3 Correlating With Stages of the World
  • 3.4 Dirichlet Dynamics With Imperfect Memory
  • 3.5 Random Sampling Dirichlet Deliberation
  • 3.6 Deliberators With Variable States
  • 4. The Emergence of Social Convention
  • 4.0 Introduction
  • 4.1 Lewis' Characterization of Conventions
  • 4.2 Convention as Correlated Equilibrium
  • 4.3 Dynamical Explanations of Conventions
  • References
  • Index

by "Nielsen BookData"

Related Books: 1-2 of 2

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