Good thinking : a knowledge first virtue epistemology
著者
書誌事項
Good thinking : a knowledge first virtue epistemology
（Routledge studies in contemporary philosophy, 114）
Routledge, 2019
- : hbk
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. [119]-124) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This book combines virtue reliabilism with knowledge first epistemology to develop novel accounts of knowledge and justified belief. It is virtue reliabilist in that knowledge and justified belief are accounted for in terms of epistemic ability. It is knowledge first epistemological in that, unlike traditional virtue reliabilism, it does not unpack the notion of epistemic ability as an ability to form true beliefs but as an ability to know, thus offering a definition of justified belief in terms of knowledge. In addition, the book aims to show that this version of knowledge first virtue reliabilism serves to provide novel solutions to a number of core epistemological problems and, as a result, compares favourably with alternative versions of virtue reliabilism both in the traditionalist and in the knowledge first camp. This is the first ever book-length development of knowledge first virtue reliabilism, and it will contribute to recent debates in these two growing areas of epistemology.
目次
Preface
Introduction
1. Process Reliabilism
2. Virtue Reliabilism: Justified Belief
3. Virtue Reliabilism: Knowledge
4. Knowledge First Virtue Reliabilism
5. The Competition
Appendix The Safety Dilemma
Appendix Lottery Cases
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